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Article
A MODEL OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORM
ANITA BERNSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
First, consider strict products liability. According to the familiar creation
myth,' products liability reform began in the United States when Roger Traynor
gazed at the products liability law of his time-negligence and warranty-and
realized that it failed to recognize the problem of social cost. He announced his
insights in 1944;2 the California Supreme Court followed along in 1962;
3
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1. The myth is retold in American casebooks on torts. Like all creation myths, the story
emphasizes genesis over continuity. The creation of strict products liability was, however, a point
within an evolution. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History
of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) [hereinafter
Priest, Enterprise Liability]. Products liability scholarship focuses closely on Traynor as visionary
and Prosser as architect, and attributes doctrines to creators. Even though I use the word myth, I
rely on the story. And even Professor Priest, who wants to diffuse the gaze aimed at Traynor, does
so by substituting alternative creators, Friedrich Kessler and Fleming James. Id. at 470-84.
Stephen Jay Gould has alluded to "our social and psychic attraction to creation myths in
preference to evolutionary stories." On the durable legend crediting Abner Doubleday with the
invention of baseball:
Baseball evolved and people grow; both are continual without definable points of
origin. Probe too far back and you reach absurdity, for you will see Nolan Ryan on the
hill when the first ape hit a bird with a stone; or you will define both masturbation and
menstruation as murder-and who will then cast the first stone? Look for something in
the middle, and you will find nothing but continuity-always a meaningful "before," and
always a more modern "after."
Stephen Jay Gould, The Creation Myths of Cooperstown, NAT. HIST., Nov. 1989, at 24.
2. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
3. See Greenmanv. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). See also Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964) (Traynor, J.) (holding that a defendant who is
"an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise" should "bear the cost of injuries
resulting from defective products").
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thereafter his co-creator4 wrought Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts'
and the Citadel articles.6 As envisioned by its creators, strict products liability
rested on the idea that defective products cause social loss, and that loss ought
to be spread among those who benefit from the product. Loss spreading would
distribute the cost of injury to manufacturers, insurers, other consumers, and
ultimately all of society.7 Strict liability also held out the promises of incentives
for safety,' respect for a manufacturer's implied assurance of safety and a
consumer's related expectation,9 an easing of plaintiffs' difficulties of proof,0
and compensation for injured persons." The creation was a success: it
became the law in the United States.
Second, consider tort reform. This project, a major conjunction of theory
and ordinary hard work, has involved many different goals and individuals: the
4. I refer to William Prosser, whose thoughts on strict products liability actually preceded
Escola. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 689 (1941). Which of the
two men was more important to the doctrine is debated. Compare JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. &
AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 137 (1987) (contributions of
Prosser) with John W. Wade, Chief Justice Traynor and Strict Tort Liability for Products, 2
HOFSTRA L. REV. 455, 462 (1974) (Traynor "entitled to full credit" for the doctrine). On the
relationship between the two men, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 197-200 (1980).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section of the Restatement is cited
more frequently than any other.
6. William L. Presser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel].
7. The seminal insights of Calabresi on this subject are first set forth in Guido Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961), and refined in GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
In "loss spreading" I conflate several terms that some other writers keep distinct: risk
spreading, risk shifting, cost internalization, occasionally "compensation." I use loss spreading
generically to refer to an approach in accident law that regards injury in terms of aggregates, or
classes of defendants and plaintiffs. Although "risk spreading" more precisely identifies the desire
to allocate future harms, I have chosen to refer to loss rather than risk in light of a belief that tort
law is remedial and retrospective.
8. See John W. Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISs. L.J. 825,
.826 (1973).
9. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
10. See William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict
Liability, 62 N.C. L. REV. 415, 425-27 (1984); see also Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of
Strict Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1092-93 (1965) (stating that the shift in the burden
of proof benefits corporate defendants as well as plaintiffs).
11. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
681 (1980).
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part of tort reform of interest here is its focus on products liability. 2
Adversaries of strict products liability in its present state seek to reduce the
effect of the doctrine through, among other devices, national or uniform
legislation. Citing anomalies in the different products liability laws of more than
fifty American jurisdictions, they have drafted a federal statute 3 and a model
Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA), 4 as well as other proposed laws for
consideration by state legislatures.'
5
Tort reform proposals related to products liability have two declared goals.
The first is to rein in a liability system deemed too expansive. Few tort-reform
measures seek to abolish strict products liability outright, but their sponsors
frequently have mentioned strict products liability as a source of excessive and
unmanageable litigation. 6 The second goal is to make products liability law
in the United States more uniform and predictable. 7
The strict products liability and tort reform movements appear antithetical.
In this Article, I argue that they are similar, and from these similarities educe
a model of products liability reform. Strict products liability and tort reform
have concerned themselves with collective distribution and allocation. These are
public goals, and the concept of public goals unites the two movements.
Strict products liability sought to create one law of product-caused injuries
for the United States: it augured loss spreading and, to a degree, an obligation
of the courts to protect weaker parties in lawsuits. Tort reform began mainly
as a cure for instabilities of insurance pricing and supply, as well as other
collective concerns: the loss of services and products, difficulties of business
planning, and a posited effect of the liability system on competitiveness in
12. In discussing products liability reform, I rely when appropriate on more general sources that
cover all of tort reform. Medical malpractice is the main subject that is present in tort reform, but
not products liability reform, proposals.
13. See S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Formerly known as the Product Liability
Reform Act, it is now called the Product Liability Fairness Act.
14. Reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). The Model Act was preceded by a Draft
Uniform Product Liability Act. See 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
15. See AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY PACKAGE (1977). For a
summary of state proposals and changes in state laws, see State Tort Reform, 16 PROD. SAFETY &
LIAB. REP. (BNA) 108 (Jan. 22, 1988).
16. See REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 30-33
(1986); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
17. SEN. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM
ACT, S. REP. No. 356, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1990) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; E. PATRICK
McGuIRE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY I (Conference Board Rep. No. 908, 1988)
("atmosphere of uncertainty"); Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis,
48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 404-09 (1987) (stating that uncertainty explains the insurance crisis).
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international trade. Supporters of both reforms first identified a social need, and
then made products liability law their instrument. As I explain below, both
reforms attempted to change private law into public law.
The terms 'public law' and 'private law' require definition for present
purposes. A conventional dichotomy between private law and public law
separates, for example, torts and contracts from constitutional, administrative,
criminal, and international law.18 In this view, all of products liability falls
within the private law category. As I use the terms here, however, the law of
products liability, which is private, has been reconceived to address goals
beyond dispute resolution between two private parties. When advocates of strict
products liability and tort reform began to shape their plans for change, they
were imagining the polis in which they wanted to live, just as public law
expresses a vision of the state that the law ought to support. Fundamentally
political, this collectivist approach brings the concerns of public law to the law
of dispute resolution.19
What can be meant by 'political'? People cannot write law in a vacuum;
any doctrine or legal system managed by the state, with enforcement powers,
expresses collective or political needs. A simple example is the law of
restitution, which chooses to respect holdings of property; enforcement of a
restitutionary judgment between A and B sends a communal message beyond
those two parties. Very well. My distinction between private law and public
law turns on what I hope is an uncontroversial claim about consciousness: some
theorists and decisionmakers try to make private law fit a social need; others
attempt to address disputes at an individual level. Private law, I believe, moves
toward public law when it is understood as a system that achieves collective
effects.' This understanding-a kind of consciousness-brings public law into
18. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196, 1230 (6th ed. 1990).
19. Some reformers are proud to be identified with the effort of making private law more like
public law. See ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PUBLIC LAW
(1969); Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959). But some
members of the tort reform movement would resist the designation. Peter Huber, for instance,
contends that "private law" before the expansion of liability was as inviolate as a cathedral, HUBER,
supra note 16, at 25, and his prescriptions in Liability invoke the tradition of private law. Both he
and Professor Epstein wish to reform tort law through a revived understandingof contract principles;
they say little about the sorts of reforms that prevail in state legislatures. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABIuTY LAw 49-56 (1980) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, LIABILITY LAW]. I stand
by my label, however, impressed by these and other writers' overwhelming theme of synthesis, or
what I call improvement and reconciliation.
20. See Cowan, supra note 10, at 1094 (declaring that creation of strict products liability was
"a move toward an equilibrium system"); Green, supra note 19, at I (stating that "We the People"
are the most important party to a lawsuit). For a recent reassessment of collective and individualist
themes in product liability, see David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law:
Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427 (1993).
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the domain of private law.
To see this distinction, recall a famous theory: the "subsidy" explanation
of nineteenth-century accident law. Proponents of the subsidy theory argue that
in the nineteenth century, American courts imposed on plaintiffs new burdens
of proving fault, and that the purpose of this shift was to subsidize fledgling
industrial companies, which needed exemption from having to pay for much of
the injury they caused. 2  Subsidy theorists rely on Brown v. Kendall2 more
than any other case in support of their argument;' but Brown v. Kendall is
"really about" two men and two dogs. 24  The opinion mentions no
corporations, and no evidence suggests that Lemuel Shaw, the author of the
opinion, had industry in mind.' To Justice Shaw, Brown v. Kendall raised
questions of private law; to subsidy theorists, who do not much care about the
conscious intent of Shaw, the case raised questions about the reallocation of
benefits and hardships in a changing economy. This difference in consciousness
separates the private-law adjudication of the Massachusetts Supreme Court from
public-law interpretation.
Consciousness matters because it has consequences. The movement from
private law to public law starts from the insight that the resolution of disputes
is actually a system, an organism with recurring and interconnected functions.
With the awareness that product liability is a system comes a desire to make that
system work better in achieving its goals. Reform efforts follow.
The ancestor of products liability reform is legal realism. The legal
realists, who brought skepticism, revisionism, and metaphors from the physical
sciences to law, shifted interest from specific doctrines to a cosmic overview.
During the period when this approach to law reached its height, the middle of
the twentieth century, products liability emerged as an idea that united sales law
and negligence. Once products liability was seen as a system, scholars could
study and challenge its purpose.'
21. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1986).
22. 60 Mass. 292 (1850) (holding that plaintiff must prove fault in trespass action).
23. See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359,
368 (1951).
24. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REv. 641,
668 (1989).
25. Id. at 669-70.
26. Noteworthy writings of this period include Calabresi, supra note 7; Green, supra note 19,
at 9-10 (applying "public law in disguise" argument to products liability); Friedrich Kessler,
Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887 (1967); Friedrich Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer
Under Modem Sales Law, Part I. A Comparative Study, 74 YALE L.J. 262 (1964); William L.
Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943) (arguing in
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Consistent with the tradition of legal realism, products liability reform takes
on two basic projects: improvement and reconciliation. Improvement comes
with the study of the purposes of products liability law. Once desirable ends are
identified, the reformer seeks to bring products liability law more closely in line
with these goals. Reconciliation addresses the need to make the products
liability system more uniform. Reformers favor order, integration, coherence.
They want to treat like situations alike. They hope to eliminate the regional
disparities, quibbling, and conflicts that disrupt uniformity. Because products
liability law involves industry, products liability reformers balance their support
of a free market for enterprise with a desire to protect the social-welfare needs
of individuals.
The improvement goal presses for change; the reconciliation goal urges
accommodation. Consider the two efforts. The significance of Greenman, for
instance, lies as much in Traynor's attempt to reconcile negligence and implied
warranty as in his change of the law to consider social cost.2" Tort reformers
have struggled to balance political acceptability against substantive change. To
achieve change in the law, they agree to blunt their reform.' Public-law
reform begins with two simultaneous ambitions, and mediates between them.
Having identified the basic goals of products liability reform, I describe a
model that explains the origins, development, and failures of both tort reform
and strict products liability. In Part II, elaborating on the schematic categories
of improvement and reconciliation, I outline what products liability reform seeks
to achieve. In Part III, I describe the results of public-law reform, with specific
references to the tort reform and strict products liability experiences. This
evaluation is mixed, and in large part condemnatory: in products liability
reform I find what the political theorist Albert Hirschman calls perversity,
futility, and jeopardy,' but also a small amount of success.
Several common pitfalls appear in the endeavors studied. In a democracy,
which is the only place in which the kind of reform I describe can take place,
favor of cost internalization); Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (pt. 2), 34 TEX. L. REV. 192
(1955) [hereinafter James, Products Liability]; Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered:
The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 550-51 (1948) (arguing in favor of shifting
cost of injuries to large enterprises); see also FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., 2 THE
LAW OF TORTS 763 (2d ed. 1956) (arguing in favor of redistribution of risk between victims and
actors engaged in risky activity).
27. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962).
28. See infra part III.A.2.
29. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
JEOPARDY (1991). 1 should add that Hirschman uses this label pejoratively, as a description of what
anti-reformers say about all attempts to achieve progress.
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proponents of a reform must win over skeptics and opponents." This
promotion of the reform proposal dilutes and distorts it. By the time the
products liability reform is in some way implemented, it has betrayed most of
the wishes of its proponents. Again, because the reform takes place in a
democracy, a question of legitimacy nags the reform movement: Who has
authority to change private law, and what goals are proper? The lack of a clear
answer contributes to the decay of the reform.
In Part IV, I return to the concept of private law, and argue in favor.of an
injury law that does not explicitly seek social and political desiderata. I do not
mean to invoke a lost Eden when the law rose above politics-that time never
was. Nor do I go so far as Ernest Weinrib, whose influence permeates this
Article, in believing that private law, at least before public-law intruders
besmirch it, is the unique domain of immanent and coherent forms of justice.3
Instead, I propose an alternative approach to products liability reform that avoids
the pitfalls detailed in Parts II and III.
Public-law reformers try to change products liability law because the prior
law does not contribute to, or perhaps even obstructs, collective well-being.
Critics of public-law influences on private law, therefore, are vulnerable to the
charge of indifference to social problems.32 I wish to pay attention to these
problems, and in Part IV, I begin with some concrete suggestions aimed at
achieving the benefits that reformers say they want. Then, accepting the fact
that private law has collective effects and consequences, I attempt nonetheless
to isolate a private law of products liability. This law, which could be called
"strict products liability," would reduce plaintiffs' burdens of proof on the
showing of a defect in the product, while maintaining some obligation to prove
producer fault. Loss or risk spreading, questions of insurance, the
competitiveness of businesses, increasing or decreasing the magnitude of
litigation, and other goals relating to the aggregate of all products liability
30. Cf Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue, in TORT
LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND CONSUMER WELFARE 247, 249
(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) [hereinafter TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST] (stating that the
tort reform movement succeeds most where groups other than manufacturers and insurers are
involved in effort).
31. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE
L.J. 949, 972 (1988).
32. See generally Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: he Care One Owes One's
Neighbors, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992) (colloquy between Weinrib and his critics); Jules L.
Coleman, Moral Theories of Tors: Their Scope and Limits (pts. 1 & 2), 1 LAW & PHIL. 371
(1982), 2 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1983).
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litigation ought to be kept separate from doctrine.33
Consistent with my interest in the practical consequences of a theory of
products liability reform, I conclude with a brief look at a place that has
achieved a private law of products liability: Europe. This inquiry helps to test
the theoretical model. Selective attention to the products liability law of Western
Europe provides some examples of how a private law might work in an
industrialized democracy. 34
In articulating the model of products liability reform, I rely on and extend
a body of literature. The academic case against products liability reform has
been made piecemeal in separate attacks on strict products liability35 and tort
reform.36 Formalist critics of instrumentalist tort law have condemned the
encroachment of public-law reformers into private law. 37  This Article seeks
to connect various misgivings that some who write about products liability have
expressed-their unease about the extraordinary ambitions expressed in products
liability reform-with jurisprudential insights.
By focusing on what tort reform and strict products liability have in
common, I am also attempting to fill a void in contemporary writing about
personal injury law. Disinterested analysis of reform efforts has been scarce.
33. As Patrick Glenn has pointed out, the center of this thesis-that cases should not be made
to fit together for collective benefit, but should remain separate and unreconciled-has analogies in
contemporary thought: chaos theory, interactive logical structures, and feminist legal theory, with
its notion of multiple voices. See H. Patrick Glenn, Harmonization of Private Law Rules Between
Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions, in XIII CONG. ON COMP. L. (1991).
34. See Anita Bernstein, Looking at Europe for the Difference Between Strict and Fault-Based
Liability, 14 J. PROD. LIAB. 207 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Looking at Europe].
35. Tort reformers have argued against strict products liability. See HUBER, supra note 16, at
34-40; WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 143-44 (1991); EPSTEIN, LIABILITY LAW, supra note 19; Alan Schwartz,
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353 (1988); George
L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987)
(hereinafter Priest, Insurance Crisis].
36. An especially concise attack on the tort reform movement is Joan Claybrook, The Consumer
Stake in Product Liability, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1178 (Feb. 20, 1991); see also
Steven Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1990); Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 539 (1990); Ralph Nader, The Assault on Injured Victims' Rights, 64 DENV. U. L. REV.
625 (1988); Eliot M. Blake, Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort
Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401 (1988).
37. See Weinrib, supra note 31; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681, 687 (1985); see also Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs.
Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985) (attacking
instrumentalism); cf. Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785 (1990) (stating
that tort law as an instrument of ideals is a failure).
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Frankness about the business origins of tort reform labels a writer as hostile to
the movement, while acknowledgement that a liability system may warrant
change, or that scholarship sympathetic to tort reform makes good points, also
classifies the writer. Even the presence, or absence, of quotation marks around
the word 'crisis' can give the reader a clue. The result is a kind of segregation,
and sharp prejudice between the pro- and anti-reform groups. I do not want to
mediate between the two: divisions in and of themselves do not indicate that the
truth falls in the middle or that tolerance is always a virtue. Rather I work with
the assumption that the tort reform movement does not occupy a different moral
plane than the more clearly consumerist creation of strict products liability. This
posture may be naive, but it helps to fix the concept of a public law of products
liability. I urge readers who believe otherwise to join me temporarily.
II. THE PROMISE OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORM
As mentioned above, advocates of a public law of strict products liability
understand products liability as a system. Participants in the system include
those persons who use products or who are subject to product risk and those
who sell them, as well as intermediaries, such as retailers and employers who
buy workplace machinery. More remotely, insurance companies, customers of
those companies, lawyers, all consumers, all manufacturers, and all members
of society are players. Injuries have social implications. The promise of a
public law of products liability is that legal doctrine will recognize not only the
rights and obligations of individuals but the effect these rights and obligations
have on society. Four stated goals are common to the two types of public
products liability law: increased uniformity, adjusted costs of marketing
products, enhanced consumer welfare, and freer flow of goods.
Whether stated goals camouflage actual goals has been the source of debate.
Some critics of the tort reform movement contend that the entire project has
only one goal: to reduce the costs of doing business and thereby increase
profits. Put another way, there is no reform here, at least in the sense of
change for the sake of improvement: only an exercise of power in favor of the
powerful. Conceding, arguendo, that tort reform may have just one real goal,
I reject this contention for two reasons. First, it disregards as uninteresting the
rhetoric of tort reform, and how this rhetoric contends with skeptics and
persuades nonmembers of the movement. Stated goals reveal the strategy of
reformers; they are more than windowdressing. Second, a cynical dismissal of
tort reform reasoning denies any similarity between consumerist and business-
driven reform. This denial can preclude consumerists from understanding the
nature of their own work. To build a tentative model of products liability
reform requires a modicum of deference to what reformers say they are doing.
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A. Increased Uniformity
From the premise that individual events involving the manufacturer and
users of products have collective consequences, a public law of products liability
seeks to reduce the collective effect that any single event may have. Systems
benefit from stability. Even though individual variation can produce the correct
or just outcome in a particular case-and indeed may point the way toward an
improved public law-the system necessarily pays a price for this variation.
Although complaints about the unpredictability of a private law of products
liability have more recently been heard from members of the tort reform
movement, 38 advocates of strict products liability grounded their reform in part
on the need to increase predictability. Harper and James, for instance, defended
their idea of a public law of personal injury by arguing that individuals are
better off under a system that blunts their risk of "ruinous loss" or "great
financial shock;" both actors who are engaged in risky activity and victims
benefit from the redistribution of risk.39 The contention that redistribution of
risk is good even for those to whom detriment is redistributed can rest only on
an idea that predictability is desirable, perhaps even advantageous, to actors who
engage in risk-creating activity.
In Greenman, Traynor made a secondary but important argument about
predictability: it should not matter, he wrote, whether an injured consumer
complied with the notice requirement of the California sales law.' Notice, of
course, is a device aimed at enhancing the knowledge of the seller. But where
sellers market their products nationwide, a notice requirement adds little to their
knowledge of the cost of injuries that their products cause. Strict products
liability has been accused of creating chaos and unpredictability so often that it
is hard to reenvision Traynor as a friend of predictability. But so he thought he
was. As Greenman and the Escola concurrence indicate," Traynor intended
38. See supra note 35 (regarding predictability); see also RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT
LIABILITY MESS 46 (1988) ("lack of uniformity, lack of predictability, and lack of consistency");
Schwartz, supra note 35 (describing crisis attributable in part to uncertainty). But see George L.
Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 498-99 (1987) (downplaying importance
of uncertainty).
39. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 26, at 763.
40. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)
41. See id. In Escola, Traynor rejected the majority view offered by Justice Gibson, who,
relying on res ipsa loquitur, declined to generalize about the relative capacities of the parties.
Instead Traynor viewed the hazard of injury as "a constant risk and a general one." It might appear
that product-caused accidents occur "haphazardly" and "intermittently," Traynor wrote, but a pattern
exists. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
Without a unifying doctrine of strict products liability, accidents appear random. But once they are
charged to the manufacturer, their predictability emerges.
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to create order through uniform doctrine. He offered manufacturers the boon
of predictability, even while increasing the amounts that they would have to pay
for accidents.
Tort reform advocates have made increased predictability their preeminent
goal. The insurance industry has summed up its explanation for what it calls the
liability crisis by reference to its inability to predict the frequency and severity
of losses.42 An empirical researcher has found that corporate officials cite
unpredictability as the major source of their discontent about the American civil
liability system.43 Business-based supporters of tort reform focus most closely
on predictability because the burden of unpredictability hurts them directly.
But the appeal of order goes beyond this group. To advocates of a public
law of products liability, predictability is both an end in itself and a means of
making the reshaping of injury law more attractive. The tort reform movement
can enlist an array of Americans in its struggle against an inconsistent,
haphazard, chaotic liability system: the movement toward lowering business
costs includes fewer natural members. This reality does not mean, as some
critics charge, that 'predictability' is a corporate euphemism for profits; nor
does it mean that American legislators and citizens who support tort reform have
been duped by propaganda. The desire for order in a system comes from
human nature as well as from the perception that such order would be
remunerative.
B. Adjusted Costs of Marketing Products
Once liability rules reflect the insight that civil liability functions in a
system, public-law proponents maintain, the price of every product marketed in
the system will reflect its true cost. True cost includes a prorated share of risk.
Each product, even if it does not happen to cause injury, represents a share of
this aggregate. For Calabresi, an important figure in the creation of American
strict products liability, no injury law could make sense without this simple
acknowledgment of true cost."
42. See Liability Insurance Crisis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization
of the House Comm. on Economic Stabilization, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1987) (statement of
Michael D. Martin, assistant counsel, American Insurance Assoc.).
43. See McGuire, supra note 17, at vii, 1-2; see also GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER,
DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND
REGULATION iii-ix, 107 (1987) (stating that unpredictability is one of several problems). But see
NathanWeber, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE (Conference Board Rep. No. 893,
1987) (stating that risk managers of Fortune 500 companies are "adapting" successfully to liability
system).
44. See CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 198.
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Although this adjustment is most identified with Calabresi and other
American theorists of the mid-twentieth century, 4 it is characteristic of all
products liability reform. A corollary to the proffered benefit of predictability,
cost adjustment makes a similar appeal to logic among listeners not yet
converted. Reform of products liability requires this added appeal.
Strict products liability began with the premise that the price of products
was kept deceptively low by liability rules that obstructed plaintiffs from
lawsuits and compensation.' The theorists who led this movement saw an
industrialized United States filled with products, a fraction of which were
defective because of the fault of the manufacturer, causing injury everywhere.
A conniving civil liability system obscured these harms. Unaccountable for the
injuries they caused, manufacturers were unaware (or could price their products
as though they were unaware) of their true CoSt. 47  Liability rules had to
confront the truth. The advocates of this kind of public products liability knew
that this confrontation would cost all Americans money-despite their arguments
about safety incentives and how these incentives would reduce the number of
accidents, they understood that the adjustment they had in mind would be an
upward one. The truth has its price, but it must be told.
Tort reformers had the same project of adjusting the cost of marketing
products; they too united to change the liability system to reflect the truth.
According to tort reform theorists, the true cost of marketing products is lower
than the cost known at present. Every product marketed in the United States
comes with what Huber calls a "tax,"' a parallel to the adjustment Traynor
had in mind in Escola.
How much of this increment ought to be reduced by reform is debated
within the reform movement. Some of the increment must be too much, though,
because the liability system now imposes charges that doctrine does not justify.
Manufacturers pay out more than they would under a properly applied fault-
based liability rule, argue the reformers; and most agree that manufacturers pay
out more than they would in a principled Traynor-Prosser universe, because
juries and some judges interpret expansively the doctrine of strict products
liability. In the view of tort reform theorists, reasonable and conscientious
manufacturers are charged an excess share of costs because the liability system
makes the class of manufacturers pay for injuries for which their products are
not responsible. Because of the unjustified verdicts for plaintiffs and transaction
45. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 26; Green, supra note 19.
46. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
47. See James, Products Liability, supra note 26, at 227-28.
48. See HUBER, supra note 16, at 11.
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costs that the present system imposes, an adjustment would save money,
according to the tort reformers.
Adjustment of costs is thus an ideal that does not specify whether the
present cost of marketing products is too high or too low. Like predictability,
this goal contains both a neutral element-accuracy, truth-and a partisan
ambition to shift costs from one sector to another. The familiar tension between
making the law more coherent and changing it to redistribute assets continues
in the problem of cost adjustment. Products liability reform seeks to price
products at a socially optimal level. The optimal price corresponds to true cost.
But what is the true cost? The answer depends on individual visions of which
costs ought to be charged to a product, and these individual visions are
determined in part by the interest of the reformer. The goal, therefore, is
chimerical.
C. Enhanced Consumer Welfare
Tort reformers identify their movement as consumerist: a cure for several
ills, including inflated prices,49 diminished services in medical care and public
recreation,' withdrawn insurance coverage,51  American disadvantage in
international trade,52 and a general loss in alternatives or options for
consumers. Traynor and Prosser announced the new solicitude for consumers
that would accompany legal reasoning in products liability cases. 3 Their
portrait of a product user-uninformed, manipulable, swayed by advertising,
lulled by trademarks-continues to both convince and enrage contemporary
49. See HUBER, supra note 16.
50. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 35.
51. See John G. Fleming, The Insurance Crisis, 24 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990).
52. See Office of the Vice President, Fact Sheet on Product Liability Reform (undated
document, ca. 1989, on file with author) (advocating "fault based liability" as essential to "U.S.
international competitiveness"); Why reforming our liability system is essential if America is to
succeed in overseas markets, insurer advertisement, TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, p. 1 ("One positive step
would be to base liability suits on fault."); Product Liability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1988) (statement of Robert H. Malott, member, Product
Liability Coordinating Committee). See also Douglas J. Besharov, Forum Shopping, Forum
Skipping, and the Problem of International Competitiveness, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW
139 (Walter Olson ed., 1988) (stating that American liability rules handicap American producers in
world trade). But see PETER REUTER, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED CORPORATE
LIABILITY: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 34-42 (1988) (stating that there is little evidence of the
liability effect on competitiveness); Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade
Performance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 30, at 127
(describing a macroeconomic critique of contention). The international-trade contention may fit also
in the category of adjusted costs of marketing products.
53. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962); Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel, supra note 6.
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writers.' The consumer is present at all attempts to create a public law of
products liability.
Strict products liability posits a dichotomy between the consumer and
industry, and, to those who accept this dichotomy, the consumerist justification
of tort reformers must be disingenuous. Tort reform does have a business
origin, whereas strict products liability began with attention to the consumer.s
It appears fair to say that the tort reform movement is the less consumerist of
the two. This conclusion is beside the point offered here: that every kind of
public products liability law has in mind a peculiar vision of the individual
product user. The uniformity of this vision means that this person is not an
individual at all.
Advocates of public products law make their case for improved consumer
welfare with third person singular pronouns. Because they are making the most
general assertions about what a consumer wants, or thinks, or needs, a reader
might have expected the plural usage. But public law advocacy apparently needs
to exploit this appearance of attention to individuals.56
To the tort reform movement, the consumer suffers most from high prices
and constraints on his choices. The consumer can read warranties and other
cautionary advice. Comfortable with bargaining,57 clear-eyed amid the vast
amount of information surrounding a product,5" and better off in a market
where a number of manufacturers compete to sell a product,59 the consumer
wants his options preserved. Even if this generalization does not represent every
consumer, goes the argument, the law ought not to deny that this type exists.
54. The Traynor/Prosser view of the consumer is reflected in Stanley Preiser, Don't Fix What
Isn't Broken: The System Works, in PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM: DEBATING THE ISSUES 35
(Kenneth L. Chilton ed., Center for the Study of Formal Publication No. 98, 1990) [hereinafter
PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM] (anecdotal discussion of product users as victims); Shapo, supra note
9 (consumer relies on representations of manufacturer). Richard Epstein and Alan Schwartz see the
consumer as more empowered and alert. See EPSTEIN, LIABILITY LAW, supra note 19, at 129-30;
Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV. 643,
654 (1978) [hereinafter Epstein, Products Liability]; Schwartz, supra note 35, at 392-96.
55. See Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 652-55 (1990) (book
review).
56. See Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Erposure, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1154 n.45 (1988) (describing municipalities involved in attempts to obtain tort
reform).
57. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 106-07.
58. See David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 300 (1986).
59. See HUBER, supra note 16, at 155.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 [1993], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss3/5
1993] PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORM 651
The Traynor-Prosser perspective descends to a low common denominator and
does not consider this more sophisticated fraction of the consumer population.
The recommendation that the tort reformers make-raise the average,
consider that the individual may be tough and smart-does not necessarily follow
from their identification of the problem. Their public law of products liability
adds new traits to, and subtracts others from, the Traynor-Prosser composite.
The term 'consumer', like the phrase 'true cost of a product', has no definition
that can be separated from the agenda of the definers.
Although their solution amounts to a variation on the problem they have
identified, tort reformers have grasped an important characteristic of public
products liability law. The individual is mentioned, but never regarded as a true
individual. In discussing their reform, advocates of a public law of products
liability identify the classes of manufacturers and consumers, corresponding to
defendants and plaintiffs. Tort reformers have added subtlety to these poles,
60
attributing to the latter traits that had been applied to producers: power,
knowledge, and especially responsiveness to economic incentives. But tort
reformers refuse to go beyond aggregate descriptions of human nature, and thus
their reform remains in the bounds of public law proposals.
Public-law proposals could, in theory, have gone beyond simplistic ideas
of a consumer. One way to begin the task of isolating the consumer in public
products liability law could have been to sort out the classes of people injured
by defective products. Workplace injury does not happen to a consumer, for
example, in the same sense that injury happens to one who has chosen a product
for personal use.6 Some consumers have contributed to their own injury.
Some have a contractual connection to the defendant. Most public-law
advocates resist even this level of individual delineation. Instead, they keep in
mind one type, and multiply this type into a public.
D. Freer Flow of Goods
Last and decidedly least, products liability reformers argue that
unreconciled doctrine obstructs the free flow of goods from region to region.
This claim is very difficult to substantiate; reformers seem half-hearted when
60. See, e.g., Aaron Twerski, National Product Liability Legislation: In Search for the Best
of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411, 417 (1982) (rejecting the distinction between
consumer and manufacturer interests).
61. For a discussion of the American problem of workplace injury caused by defective
machinery, where the plaintiff sues a manufacturer instead of her employer who is protected by
workers' compensation, see Paul C. Weiler, Workers' Compensation and Product Liability: The
Interaction of a Tort and Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825 (1989).
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they argue that divergence in the law means obstruction to the flow of goods.62
But the appeal of free trade and access to consumer items, like the appeal of
predictability, is too useful a rhetorical goal to ignore.
Some members of the tort reform movement level a charge of regional self-
dealing and undesirable divergences against the American federal system
wherein states determine liability rules. In his tort reform polemic, The Product
Liability Mess, 3 Judge Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court
argues that separate products liability laws in the American system distort
competition. The typical expensive products liability lawsuit is filed in a court
located in the state where the plaintiff, not the defendant, resides. In pursuit of
local popularity, the judge-Neely does not exempt himself-will feel pressure
to favor the plaintiff and her attorney, who may be a crony or campaign
contributor.6 State courts, and to some degree federal courts located in a
particular state, distort competition by engaging in parochial self-dealing. A
comprehensive national products liability law, to Neely, would end this
perversity and enhance economic growth.'
Despite shifts in the makeup of state supreme courts since the days when
California and New Jersey were deemed liberal, tort reform writers still identify
plaintiffs' havens. 6  The Supreme Court has shown some willingness to
approve the dismissal of products liability lawsuits brought in state courts against
manufacturers, agreeing with defendants that the forum state lacks
jurisdiction. 7 Assuming a link between a pro-plaintiff tradition or doctrine and
62. A freer-flow-of-goods argument appears in Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A
Permanent Solution for Product Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 DENV.
U. L. REV. 685, 694-95 (1988).
In Europe, proponents of a Community-wide reform of products liability law contended that
varying liability rules in the member nations distorted competition and therefore, under the Treaty
of Rome, these rules had to be reconciled. As a European Community report noted, no evidence
of this claim was ever brought forth. See Report of the Legal Affairs Committee, 1978-1979 EUR.
PARL. Doc. (No. 246) 7 (1978) [hereinafter Legal Affairs). One observer described the claim as
a "cant." See Frank A. Orban III, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement-Foreign
National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 342, 379 (1978).
63. NEELY, supra note 38.
64. Id. at 62-63, 71-72. "What do I care about the Ford Motor Company?" Neely writes.
"To my knowledge Ford employs no one in West Virginia in its manufacturing processes, and
except for selling cars in West Virginia, it is not a West Virginia taxpayer." Id. at 71.
65. Id. at 78.
66. Walter Olson finds several plaintiffs' havens in the United States, including California,
Philadelphia, the Texas Gulf Coast, and New Jersey. See OLSON, supra note 35, at 85, 171.
67. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); cf. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (dismissing a products liability action against an American
defendant on the ground of forum non conveniens).
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the cost of doing business, it may be worthwhile for a supplier to identify states
sympathetic to plaintiffs and avoid significant activity in those states. This
decision would reduce the flow of goods to consumers residing in pro-plaintiff
states. A contrary decision, which apparently has been made, means that
residents of pro-defendant states pay for the expansive doctrine they dislike
through nationally-rated insurance premiums and uniform pricing. National
legislation offers a way out of this dilemma. A public law of products liability,
sensitive to business decisionmaking, would unify diverse American laws so that
the residents of all states might enjoy an equivalent market.
A similar public-law impulse is evident in the creation of strict products
liability, which sought to bring together two overlapping doctrines. Between the
acceptance of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.'8 and the ascendancy of strict
liability in tort, products liability cases were governed by the law of both
negligence and implied warranty. The law of implied warranty posed conceptual
difficulties: when courts required privity between the plaintiff and the
defendant, they were regarding implied warranty as contractual. Yet implied
warranty law has origins in tort,' and several courts in the first half of this
century treated implied warranty as though it were a tort cause of action. 70
The applicability of contract-based rules such as those expressed in the Uniform
Commercial Code become less clear. 71
Traynor faced this problem in Greenman,' where the manufacturer
argued that Greenman could not bring a warranty action because he had not
complied with a statutory requirement of timely notice. Privity did exist
between Greenman and Yuba Power Products, Traynor noted, and therefore the
plaintiff and the defendant were subject to the law of implied warranty: but the
better rule would be to put aside warranty in favor of strict liability in tort.
Recovery should not hinge on the fortuity of whether the victim and the
manufacturer had a contract. Warranties "were developed to meet the needs of
commercial transactions,"' and the remedies of "injured consumers ought not
to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales."'74
For Traynor and others, strict products liability offered the hope of
68. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
69. See F.B. Ames, The History ofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888).
70. See, e.g., Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst, 40 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. 1949) (holding a
liberal tort rule for recovery of damages); Gosling v. Nichols, 442, 139 P.2d 86 (Cal. App. 2d
1943) (holding a tort rule on survival of actions).
71. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978) (stating an implied warranty of merchantability); see also id.
§ 2-315 (stating an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
72. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
73. Id. at 901.
74. Id.
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resolving both contract-law complications and the confusion of a mixed tort-
contract regime for deciding products cases. As the Restatement notes, strict
products liability sweeps over many issues relevant to warranty analysis.
Reliance, notice, disclaimers, the validity of the original contract, and the labels
of 'buyer' and 'seller', for examples, are all summarily rejected in Section
402A. 7'
Although Traynor appeared dismissive of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the Code probably inspired him toward expansive reform. The UCC, a triumph
of harmonization, had enhanced interstate commerce by creating an integrated
commercial law.76 A public law of product injury could go even further. The
creators of strict products liability boldly declared that strict liability in tort
superseded the UCC. In effect, they were saying that what the Code could do,
strict products liability could do better. Thus they made, by implication, a claim
about the flow of goods.'
E. Summary
The four major goals of products liability reform are used to connect the
reform to people who are not yet convinced that the movement should flourish.
Proponents link their reform to unassailable improvements. Of the four goals,
predictability stands up best to examination. This goal is so attractive that even
strict products liability advocates relied on it, and tort reformers emphasize
predictability as their primary goal. Under scrutiny, the other goals appear
slogan-like. Visions of a true cost or price of products, as well as the concept
of a consumer and the goal of liberating trade, prove to be dependent on what
the reformer plans to achieve. But perhaps reform adds up to more than the
sum of its goals: reformers remind their audience that "We the People," in Leon
Green's phrase,' ought to think about the aggregate effects of product-caused
injury.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965).
76. The UCC, though a reform of private law for aggregate benefit, does not raise the dangers
I discuss when it is interpreted mainly as a rule book for voluntary players. Collectivist commercial
law is a sound idea. It is more modest than Traynor/Prosser strict products liability, affecting fewer
people directly. And whereas goals such as the freer flow of goods or increased predictability are
merely attractive for personal injury law, they are essential for commerce.
77. The rivalry between advocates of strict liability in tort and UCC partisans over products
liability territory has ebbed. Reed Dickerson argued in favor of the UCC in Reed Dickerson, The
ABCs of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV.
439, 452 (1969) [hereinafter Dickerson, ABCs]. Such arguments are seldom seen in law reviews
today.
78. See Green, supra note 19, at 1.
654
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 [1993], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss3/5
1993] PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORM 655
III. WHAT REFORM DELIVERS
Public-law reformers of products liability doctrine promise that beneficial
social change will result from their proposals. In practice this change does not
occur as predicted. First, for reasons discussed in section A below, the reform
is unstable. It cannot be implemented as its proponents wish. Opposition and
dilution reduce the effect of the public-law proposal. Second, once
implemented, the reform is blocked by new obstacles which are described in
section B. Doctrine and results are never completely integrated; between
implementation and social change lie conditions that make the reform unable to
deliver the promised changes. Some of these conditions common to reform are
analyzed below.
Reform movements do not, in fact, follow my subheadings and divide into
readily observable stages of "before implementation" and "after
implementation." Especially when the reformer profits financially from the state
of reform, but even where financial benefit does not affect the movement, the
public-law advocate seldom pauses to declare that a job is well done. More
work always remains. For analysis, however, it is useful to note the points
where reformers have reached a major achievement.
By implementation of public law, then, I refer to the point of significant
acceptance. Strict products liability reached implementation when a large
majority of state courts adopted Section 402A,79 although synthesis of the
theory was achieved several years earlier.' Implementation of tort reform is
marked by the agreement in virtually every state government, during the 1980s,
that liability was too expansive and needed to be curbed by reform.8 Further
implementation may arrive either with the passage of a uniform or national law,
or with widespread gain in persuasion.'
79. Section 402A has been accepted by the supreme courts of 37 states. See 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.9 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 3d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1993). Of
the remaining states, only four do not accept the doctrine of strict products liability. Id. at §§ 16.18-
16.23.
80. See Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 1, at 505.
81. See Lipsen, supra note 30, at 266-71 (containing an appendix that summarizes state tort
reform).
82. Henderson and Eisenberg report evidence of such gain. See James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal
Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990). The episodic achievements of the tort reform movement
may be seen in casebooks attempting to explain tort reform patterns. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL.,
PRODUCTS LIABILITYAND SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1036 (2d ed. 1989). Professor Epstein,
who is affiliated with tort reform, began the 1987 supplement to his Torts casebook with a passage
about the overwhelming importance of tort reform; the passage does not appear in the 1990 edition.
Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (5th ed. 1990) with RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW (4th ed. Supp. 1987).
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Like Part II, this Part is descriptive. Using examples of the opposition and
dilution that take place before the reform is implemented, the discussion in
Section A seeks to show the inevitability of these encroachments on a reform
proposal. Similarly, the examples examined in Section B are offered to support
the broader idea of obstacles that diminish reform once it is implemented.
A. Before Implementation
1. Opposition
The public law theorist first faces the problem of convincing opponents.
A vision for change of the status quo will necessarily encounter skepticism and
resistance. Opposition always occurs despite the reformer's belief-which,
again, is assumed in this Article to be sincere-that reform will produce wide
collective benefit.
Opposition appears most clearly in pointed opprobrium. After reading the
Escola concurrence, Roscoe Pound accused Traynor of authoritarianism and
bringing American law closer to socialism; 3 plaintiffs' lawyers denounce the
"tort deform" movement;4 opponents impugn the goals of reformers.
When critics oppose tort reform, they say that this movement is best
understood as a kind of interested advocacy, like lobbying, created to enhance
the prosperity of wealthy institutions and individuals.85 Groups that have
joined the opposition to nationwide products liability reform include consumer,
environmental, and women's groups; the American Bar Association (ABA); the
American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA); and several associations of state
government officials;" these groups, with the exception of ATLA, are not
necessarily opposed to tort reform in general. Individual opponents of tort
reform have argued that the movement relies on dubious premises. 87
83. See ROSCOE POUND, NEW PATHS OF THE LAW 39-47 (1950); Roscoe Pound, Law in the
Service State: Freedom versus Equality, 36 A.B.A. J. 977, 981 (1950).
84. See Andrew Blum, Women Starting to Get to Top of Bar Groups, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11,
1991, at 22, 24 (statement of Roxanne Conlin, vice president, American Trial Lawyers Association);
Big Damage Awards May Be in Decline, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1990, Business Section, p. 7
(statement of Russ Herman, President, Trial Lawyers Association of America). See also Page,
supra note 54 ("deforming tort law").
85. At a speech I attended in Chicago on December 4, 1990, Ralph Nader said that the emotion
behind tort reform is not so much avarice but distaste for pretrial discovery. Individuals almost
never pay large judgments directly, and so an expansive liability system does not threaten their own
holdings. But the prospect of a long, inconveniently-timed deposition, or exposure of their personal
documents, affronts the business-affiliated spokespersons for tort reform.
86. See Lipsen, supra note 30, at 254.
87. See supra note 36.
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Tort reformers respond to this opposition by contending that their proposals
would benefit consumers as well as producers," and that unreformed tort law
enriches the plaintiffs' bar more than consumers.89 Thus, tort reformers
represent both a reform that suffers attack and a source of attack on another
reform. But the symmetry is inexact, because while some advocates of tort
reform movement blame Traynor and Prosser (and thus represent both a reform
and an attack on a reform),9° other tort reformers focus on the notion of loss
spreading that strict products liability pioneered, 9 while still others address
generally the size and scope of the civil liability system.'
The most basic example of opposition in products liability reform is the
simple mistrust described above, with opponents aligning themselves into the
dichotomies of rich versus poor, defendant versus plaintiff, manufacturer versus
consumer; this line of division is of keen importance to the public law theorist.
The dichotomy is based on the criterion of wealth. Opponents of tort reform
can readily use this dichotomy. It is easy to say that tort reformers are wrong
because their movement is tainted, perhaps controlled, by wealth, but harder to
apply this type of opposition to the originators of strict products liability, who
had no financial stake in their fate.'
Although these originators cannot be accused of avarice, they have been
scrutinized by critics who attribute their public law proposal to an idiosyncratic
or distorted view of the world. According to George Priest, "enterprise
liability" arose after the influential advocacy of James and Kessler.' Fleming
James dreamed of a day when social welfare systems would supersede tort law;
88. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
89. See HUBER, supra note 16, at 223-24; NEELY, supra note 38, at 49; see also Peter
Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The Best Paid Lawyers in America, FORBES, Oct. 16, 1989, at 197
(describing the wealth of plaintiffs' lawyers). This complaint is not limited to the current tort reform
movement. See, e.g., JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN
(1979) (stating that a no-fault system is better for injured persons).
90. Peter Huber opposes the civil liability system created by "the Founders," who include
Traynor and Prosser. See HUBER, supra note 16, at 6. He also disapproves of Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., a major Traynor opinion. See HUBER, supra note 16, at 19-20; see also supra note 3
(quoting Vandermark). Richard Epstein criticizes Greenman and the Escola concurrence, see
EPSTEIN, LIABILITY LAW, supra note 19, at 36-48, but saves his wrath for Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See EPSTEIN, LIABILITY LAW, supra
note 19, at 50-56.
91. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 35.
92. This concern is expressed most often by nonacademic members of the tort reform
movement, but the tort reform scholars cited allude to it as well.
93. See Page, supra note 55, at 654-55. Here I distinguish between originators and defenders
of strict products liability. The latter group may have a financial interest at stake. See also infra
text accompanying notes 203-05.
94. Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note 1, passim.
Bernstein: A Model of Products Liability Reform
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993
658 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
Friedrich Kessler worried about coercion, and regarded all transactions between
unequals with suspicion.95 These two personalities came together to support
an expansive public law of products liability. For James in torts and Kessler in
contracts, private law was inferior to a collective vision. According to Priest,
their individual penchants lay behind American enterprise liability.
Before the formation of political symmetry, whereby defenders of strict
products liability opposed and were opposed by tort reformers, opposition could
have been expressed without identifying the critic as a member of a camp. One
dissent from strict products liability as envisioned by Traynor and Prosser
appears in a 1974 law review tribute to Roger Traynor.' Praising Justice
Traynor as "one of our finest judges," Reed Dickerson objected to Traynor's
elevation of strict liability in tort over the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which, as legislation, ought to outrank judicial lawmaking.97 To
Dickerson, the UCC could have been used for almost all of the consumer
protection that Traynor had in mind, with the added virtues of clarity and
consistency with past rules.9 Skepticism about strict products liability in favor
of the UCC has faded; once it was a vital source of opposition. Opposition now
usually takes place on public-law terms: critic and reformer alike have a
political vision of the state and seek to promote that vision by changing the law.
2. Dilution
Faced with opposition, the public law theorist dilutes the proposed reform
to reduce its threat. Compromise is of course part of any change in the laws of
democratic countries: but the compromises necessary to change private law to
public law follow a pattern unique to themselves. To make their reform
acceptable, those who would change private law to be more public offer their
opponents concessions that point up what is most valued about private law.
A private law of products liability permits variation from case to case. In
the struggle between individual circumstances of the litigants and the collective
need for consistency within products liability litigation, private-law concerns
militate in favor of greater emphasis on individual circumstances. Public-law
reformers begin by disparaging this force in products liability law, and in the
end give in to it. Dilution therefore consists of the recognition of private-law
pressures within the public-law reform.
95. Id. at 465-83, 484-89.
96. Reed Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? or Should the Judge's Monument Be
Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 469 (1974) [hereinafter Dickerson, Prosser's Folly].
97. Id. at 486-87.
98. See id.; see also Dickerson, ABCs, supra note 77 (containing an earlier expression of this
argument).
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a. Strict Products Liability Diluted
Gary Schwartz's classic summary of strict products liability" shows that
American case law has diluted the doctrine. Strict products liability could have
meant liability for all injuries caused or occasioned by products, Professor
Schwartz wrote, regardless of whether they were defective. I"° "Strict" could
have meant something close to absolute. This hypothetical version of the law,
which Schwartz called "genuine strict liability, ""' has no respectable support
as a matter of policy, and it is apparent from the Greenman opinion that Traynor
was not recommending "genuine" strict liability."°e But the justification of
loss spreading in theory does not depend on the existence of a defect. 03 If the
creators of strict products liability valued loss spreading more than the need to
protect manufacturers from greatly expanded liability, then Traynor may be said
to have diluted his original reform.
Dilution can also be seen in the question of the state-of-the-art defense.
Strict products liability began with proposals that were silent on this question,
because a state-of-the-art defense, which takes details and individual products
into account, is generally absent in visions of a public law of products liability.
Dilution of the proposal includes the recognition of individual circumstances.
The outcome of Beshada v. Johns-Manville" made clear the dilution of
strict products liability. In Beshada, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
a manufacturer who could not have known of a risk at the time of marketing can
be liable for failure to warn.0 5 The repudiating case, Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories," in turn diluted the Beshada rule by limiting it to asbestos
cases. Today the state-of-the-art defense is the law in the United States. 10
7
A manufacturer who acted reasonably at the time of marketing, who knew what
was known about relevant technology, and who made the product as safely as
anyone could is entitled to prevail in a design-defect action. Beshada and
Feldman are synecdoches, of course: they stand for the expression, and then the
99. Gary T. Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435 (1979).
100. Id. at 441.
101. Id.
102. In dicta Traynor noted that a plaintiff bringing an action in strict products liability would
have to prove that he was using the product as intended and that he was unaware of the danger.
Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. At a minimum this standard would entitle the manufacturer to defenses
based on misuse, or the obviousness of a danger.
103. See Powers, supra note 10, at 425.
104. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
105. Id. at 549.
106. 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984).
107. For a reaffirmation, see Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Co., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal.
1991).
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rejection, of liability without fault on the part of the manufacturer.
b. Tort Reform Diluted
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA),"5 drafted under the
leadership of a tort reform scholar," concedes several issues important to the
movement in favor of making the statute attractive to legislatures. Although the
impetus for a uniform act came from the tort-reformist Department of
Commerce and sponsors from industry, as a cure for open-ended doctrine and
unpredictability, the UPLA follows a balancing approach." °  Both strict
liability and negligence appear in the UPLA."' This deviation from
uniformity follows the existing conflicts in state laws. It dilutes the force that
uniformity would have provided.
More specific examples of dilution are numerous. In the final version of
the UPLA, the drafters diluted an industry-standards compliance defense for
design and warning cases that had been included in an earlier draft: the statute,
like the unreformed law of most states, now provides that compliance with
industry standards is just one factor to be considered in determining
liability." 2 The UPLA also failed to include a statute of repose, even though
insurers had stressed its importance; the drafters substituted a rebuttable
presumption that after ten years a product is beyond its useful safe life." 3
This presumption is weakened with several exceptions." 4  Attempting to
modify the collateral source rule, the UPLA provides that only compensation
traceable to tax revenues, such as Medicaid or Medicare, can reduce the amount
of an award-a dilution that reflects the drafters' decision to spare middle-
income plaintiffs from the brunt of the statute. The drafters' need to reduce the
burden of reform, limiting it to poorer plaintiffs, shows the phenomenon of
dilution.
The first proposed federal products liability law that the Senate considered
108. UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter
UPLAI.
109. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Uniforn Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, .33 VAND.
L. REv. 579 (1980).
110. See Terry M. Dworkin, Product Liability Reform and the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, 60 NEB. L. REv. 50, 61 (1981) [hereinafter Dworkin, Model Product Liability Act].
111. See, e.g., UPLA § 104 (A), (D), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721 (stating the strict liability for
mismanufactured products); UPLA § 104 (A), (C), id. (stating a fault standard for design and
warnings).
112. See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979); UPLA
§ 107 (B), (C), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,728.
113. UPLA § 110 (B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,732.
114. See Dworkin, Model Product Liability Act, supra note 110, at 69-70.
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followed closely the final Uniform Product Liability Act." 5 Offered by
Senator Robert Kasten, this bill replaced strict products liability with a
negligence standard for design and warning claims, established a state of the art
defense, and strengthened the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption
of risk, and product misuse."6 The bill also abolished joint and several
liability, required judges rather than jurors to determine the amount of punitive
damages, and, following the lead of comment k of the Restatement, provided for
an absolute defense for injuries resulting from unavoidably unsafe products." 7
The bill was reported out of committee, but died in committee in the following
Congress.
Dilution of the first Senate bill is evident in the efforts of Senator John
Danforth to enact a federal products liability law. In 1985, he introduced a bill
similar to the Kasten predecessor."' Although it preserved much of the
change that Kasten had included, the Danforth bill included additional
provisions, mostly procedural changes to encourage settlements and deter
frivolous claims and defenses."' The additional provisions, included in an
attempt to widen support, diminished the focus on tort reform goals. Danforth's
1985 bill did not attract a majority, and the Senator later proposed what one
commentator called "a less controversial scaled down core bill."' m This
second version emphasized expedited settlements almost to the exclusion of
changes in substantive law.' 2' Among other dilutions, the revision replaced
the abolition of joint and several liability with the abolition of joint and several
liability for noneconomic losses.'2
Legislation current as of this writing, S. 640, which resembles the revised
Danforth bill, has been described as less "draconian" and "severe" than its
predecessors. ' Its new title, the Product Liability Fairness Act (Act),
indicates its sponsors' desire to move beyond a reformist constituency by
115. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Other bills also modeled on the UPLA were
introduced in the House before the introduction of S. 2631. See H.R. 5626, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); H.R. 7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
116. See S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
117. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (stating that a product is
not unreasonably dangerous if it is unavoidably unsafe). Liability for failure to warn, however,
might remain.
118. See S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
119. See, e.g., id. sees. 111 (review panel); 201-11 (expedited procedures).
120. Lipsen, supra note 30, at 258. The bill was S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
121. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 4, at 752-53.
122. The Danforth bill reached the floor of the Senate, but went no further. See Lipsen, supra
note 30, at 258-59.
123. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 54 (remarks of Senator Hollings).
Bernstein: A Model of Products Liability Reform
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993
662 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
appealing to a loftier principle. Dilution continues.'2
This thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern of a public law proposal may look
like a triumph of reasoned compromise over two extremes. But this benign
conclusion evades the question of whether the law has improved more with a
diluted reform than with the status quo ante. What might be called synthesis or
compromise is better understood as dilution, because proposals for public law
are not born of conflicts between groups but rather come from a particular
vision.
B. After Implementation
Despite obstacles, strict products liability and the tort reform movement
have achieved some degree of implementation. At this point in its development,
the proposal for a public law of products liability has been altered by conflict,
but regardless of the form of the proposal, it cannot fulfill the ambitions of its
creators. The infirmity of all public law changes in private-law doctrine is that
they assume the existence of responsive institutions and individuals, who will
execute the reform. Weak links, however, separate the reform as implemented
from results planned.
1. Judicial Cooperation
Reform of legal doctrine cannot change the law without some cooperation
from judges, who both preside over each individual lawsuit and say what the law
is. Although each judge will have a duty to follow the reform as implemented,
in practice the reform cannot withstand large-scale failure or refusal to
cooperate. In the United States, limitations, traditions, and obligations constrain
federal and state judges as they work within the reformed law. These
constraints may conflict with the newly-implemented public law.
a. Ambiguities
Public-law reform must leave the management of individual cases-and
124. A newer bill, introduced by Representative Avery in late 1991, demonstrates a
phenomenon similar to dilution: The more "draconian" or "severe" a proposed statute appears, the
more accommodation must be made to soften its appearance. Representative Avery and his
cosponsors named their bill the "Consumer Price Reduction Act," even though its sole stated
purpose was to impose "certain restrictions on product liability actions." See H.R. 3375, 102d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). Going much further than S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), the bill
takes punitive damages from plaintiffs and puts them into a crime victims' fund, and requires losing
parties to pay their opponents' costs and attorneys' fees. Id., secs. 3 & 4. How this bill, if enacted,
would reduce prices is not explained, yet sponsors of this restrictive legislation wish their measure
to be identified as consumerist.
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some additional flexibility to interpret the reform-to the individual judge.
Some level of ambiguity is built into the public law. Because different judges
will choose different interpretations in similar cases, the public law of products
liability becomes more diffuse. Although this ambiguity exists in all of law, it
is unwelcome in public-law reform, which seeks uniformity as a major goal.
Tort reform statutes leave room for much judicial influence. The UPLA
and the current version of the federal Act purport to move products liability law
more toward negligence." z Whether this standard dictates a retreat from the
present law of products liability or merely reaffirms the persistence of fault in
what is called strict products liability is a question that different judges could
answer differently. Both the Act and the UPLA insist that plaintiffs retain the
burden of proof in claims of defective product design, but retain traces of a
stricter liability in other kinds of product claims. The details of these standards
can be illuminated only by judicial interpretation.'
Other reform proposals, found both in comprehensive measures like the Act
and the UPLA and in piecemeal state-level change, also depend on judicial
construction. What, for instance, is a "product liability action" that warrants
unique treatment in courts? Definitions offered in the Act, the UPLA, and state
reform laws are not in all situations self-applying. 21 Caps on pain and
suffering damages, abolition or reduction of joint liability, modification of the
common-law evidentiary rule about compensation received from a collateral
source, and indeed virtually all changes commanded by state law have raised
bona fide controversy as to their application.
Similar questions vex traditional strict products liability. What does 'strict'
mean? Fault has pervaded application of the Traynor-Prosser reform. Defenses
have always been condoned, even in the Greenman opinion, but courts have
differed on the question of their weight. The ambiguity that may be of most
125. See UPLA § 104 (A), (C), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721; S. 640, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., see.
302 (a)(1)(b) (1991) (stating that a plaintiff must prove that a "product seller failed to exercise
reasonable care with respect to the product").
126. See Dworkin, Model Product Liability Act, supra note 110, at 79 (1981) (stating that
courts and juries free to act flexibly despite formal allocation of proof).
During the revisions of federal products liability legislation, where reformist members of
Congress struggled to create a comprehensive law that would be both meaningful and feasible, one
reformer acknowledged the impossibility of the task: Even if a reform bill were passed, "there
would be nothing to stop the 50 states from interpreting whatever we did from scratch." Lipsen,
supra note 30, at 258 (quoting Senator John Danforth).
127. The pending federal bill leaves part of the definition of "product" to state law, see S. 640,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 102 (13) (1991). These definitions vary from state to state. See
Malcolm Wheeler, The Need for Narrow Tort Reform: Abolishing Strict Product Liability, in
PRODUCT LIABIUTY REFORM, supra note 53, at 23, 24-29.
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practical significance pertains to the roles of judge and jury. Can any questions
of products liability be answered as a matter of law?"2S A major topic in
traditional strict products liability, application of the risk-utility test for design
defect,'" is the proper responsibility of judges according to some courts, and
of the jury according to others. "3
b. Private Agendas
Empowered to reshape public law, the judge will bring to each case her
own life experiences, knowledge of and regard for prior private law, and
personal goals. This set of traits will move outcomes toward more
idiosyncratic, and less collectivist, directions; public law will become more
private even when judges cooperate with the reform. Legal Realist writers have
canvassed this subject thoroughly. 3' In products liability litigation, the judge
is affected not only by her own disposition and character, but also by the fact
that the plaintiff and the defendant usually come from different places. Mass
manufacture and distribution enable users to live far from producers. Proximity
to one party may affect the judge, who probably lives in the same region as one,
but not both, of the parties.'32
Public-law theorists might respond that if private agendas are a problem,
their proposal is a solution. By making the law more uniform, they combat
parochialism and the backscratching that Neely has identified.' The first
problem with this response is that private agendas are not necessarily an ill to
be cured. Although custom, procedural rights, and legal ethics entitle a litigant
to impartial adjudication, individual bias can be addressed without the drastic
response of public law. A private agenda may be superior to a public one.
Private agendas are not problems unless one has a collectivist agenda. The
second problem is that private agendas persist even after reform, so that the
problems they contribute remain.
c. Lack of Coordination Among Courts
In any system amenable to public law reform, courts have a degree of
128. See Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design
Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521
(1982).
129. See Wade, supra note 8, at 837-38.
130. Compare Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 1-76 (Mich. 1984) with O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
131. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 136-39 (1930); KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 46-50 (1960).
132. See NEELY, supra note 38, at 71-72.
133. See id. at 78. For a similar public-law argument, see infra note 152.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 [1993], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss3/5
1993] PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORM 665
freedom to diverge from one another. Thus even if private agendas can be
suppressed, judges will be cooperating with the public law reform to different
extents and at different times. Whether a reform will be applied retrospectively
or prospectively cannot be answered with precise detail in advance. Different
cases are ready for decision at different times. The reform, then, cannot begin
at any exact moment, and cases will affect the outcomes of their successors.
Again, the state-of-the-art controversy provides an example. This problem
appears eternally provocative. The same court that decided Beshada came back
a year later with Feldman. Courts continue to disagree about its meaning.
State-of-the-art can be invoked in several situations, each conceptually different
from the others." And whether it is truly a defense to be pleaded and proved
by defendant-a potentially difficult burden, tantamount to proving a
negative-still plagues the courts.
Judges will disagree about the current state-of-the-art for a particular
technology. Information, in general, moves fitfully into the courts: Henderson
and Eisenberg, for instance, used the phrase "quiet revolution" in the title of
their article to describe a little-noticed trend away from pro-plaintiff court
decisions.'35 The article argued that judges themselves were unaware of their
being part of a trend. Courts cannot keep up uniformly with tendencies in
other courts, or product innovation, or a need to change the law.
d. Conflicting Duties and Principles
Counterforces pull the judge away from cooperation with the reform.
Opponents to the reform, as was argued above, decry and then dilute the
reform. Their existence is known to the judge, who cannot ignore them
completely. Ideological or political opposition aside, the judge lives within
general norms of comity and judicial restraint, and specific limits on her
power. 1
37
Specific limits on judicial and legislative power are of more direct force
than external politics or general norms. State and federal constitutional law
interfere with the tort reform agenda. Compulsory arbitration or summary jury
trials, provisions for expedited settlements that punish parties who insist on
134. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the 7ime Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CAL. L. REv. 919, 921 (1981).
135. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 82.
136. Id. at 514-15.
137. Most judges would accept this constraint on their ability to comply with public-law reform.
But see Dickerson, Prosser's Folly, supra note 96, at 486-87 (describing that judges have held that
strict liability in tort supersedes the UCC, in defiance of legislative supremacy).
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going to trial, and alternative compensation schemes have been challenged as
violative of the right to a jury trial."u Courts have said that statutes of repose
infringe rights guaranteed by state constitutions,'39 and have struck down caps
on pain and suffering damages."4 The Supreme Court has refused to interpret
constitutional provisions as constraints on punitive damages, 4' despite
strenuous tort reform efforts. 4 ' Judicial noncooperation had an apparently
lesser effect on strict products liability, but this appearance is at odds with the
reality of the ten years or so after the adoption of Section 402A. Tort reform
writers did not deem many decisions excessive or unprincipled until around the
mid-1970s. Thus if Traynor, Prosser, and their colleagues really did intend to
foment litigation and thereby redistribute wealth-a doubtful notion-then they
may have been stymied by courts that did not play along. Because the strict
products liability movement sought to change the law by persuasion, the record
shows few outright rebuffs like the rejection of the federal statute and the
UPLA. Explicit rejections have appeared, 143  but more often judicial
noncompliance has taken the form of retaining pre-Greenman fault and warranty
or creeping away from expansive pro-plaintiff doctrine.
138. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a court
cannot compel participation in a summaryjury trial); Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa.
1980) (holding that mandatory arbitration for medical malpractice violates the right to a jury trial);
Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-40 (Ill. 1976) (same). Cf
Christopher J. Trombetta, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose:
Judicial Conscience versus Legislative Will, 34 VILL. L. REv. 397 (1989) (arguing that statutes
restricting litigants' opportunities are often struck down because of their "manifest unfairness").
139. Citing state analogues to the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, state supreme courts have struck down several statutes of repose. See, e.g., Heath v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983) (holding that the statute denies equal protection
and equal access to courts); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Haggerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982)
(holding that the statute is arbitrary); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454
(Wis. 1975) (holding that the statute violates right to equal protection).
140. See Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d
825 (N.H. 1980). But see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (upholding
cap).
141. See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 61 U.S.L.W. 4766 (U.S. June
25, 1993) (stating that a $10 million punitive damage award-where the actual damage award was
$19,000-was not so "grossly excessive" as to violate the Due Process Clause); Pacific Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (holding that jury discretion to award punitive damages
does not violate due process protection); Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment Excessive-Fines Clause
does not constrain punitive damages).
142. Institutions affiliated with the tort reform movement filed numerous amicus briefs in Haslip
and Browning-Ferris.
143. For instance, North Carolina does not accept the doctrine of strict products liability.
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2. For Expansionists: Patterned Inequities
All public-law reform purports to create new collective allocations through
changes in the law. Expansive law reform, a category that includes strict
products liability, strives to redistribute wealth from the class of defendants to
plaintiffs.'" Discrimination, however, makes the transfer of wealth more
complex.1 Within the class of intended beneficiaries, discrimination skews
allocation in patterns unintended by the reformer.
The effect of discrimination, moreover, expands under a reform scheme.
To the extent that the reform works-contrary to my overall contention that it
can have little real effect-discrimination becomes more important. This effect
is more modest in a legal system that focuses on disputes between individuals,
and avoids adding collective aspirations.
Because of antecedent inequities, the civil liability system delivers unequal
benefits to groups of plaintiffs. The data are familiar, and virtually undisputed.
The Rand Corporation found that black plaintiffs in personal injury cases receive
awards twenty-five percent lower than those of white plaintiffs for the same
injury. Black plaintiffs suing black defendants receive sixty percent of what
white plaintiffs receive from white defendants. Black plaintiffs receive
significantly less in cases involving very severe workplace injuries.'"
Wisconsin researchers found that accident victims who were black were less
likely than white victims to assert tort claims.' 47 Black litigants, whether
plaintiffs or defendants, were more likely than white litigants to lose at trial.'"
Economic-loss principles explain much of the difference: because of
discrimination, white plaintiffs earn higher wages than African-American
plaintiffs. This gap pertains to women, although the data are less clear that
women receive lower pay awards than men for the same injuries.'49
144. Or, at a minimum, at least to deliver fairly the benefits of the legal system. For a
statement of this liberal position, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-85 (1986) (declaring
that "integrity" mandates treating like cases alike).
145. By "discrimination" I refer to unequal treatment of members of groups, such as African-
Americans or women, that exists generally in society; I am not referring to specific instances of bias
against individuals.
146. See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, RAND CORPORATION, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 29, 32, 36-41 (1984). 1 use the term
"black" for racial designation when citing published work that does so, and "African-American" for
my own assertions.
147. See Richard E. Muller & Austin Serat, Grievances, Clains and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525, 552-54 (1981).
148. Id.
149. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 146.
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Discrimination burdens women more at the pretrial levels. Injuries to women
are more likely to take place at home, where the victim is less likely to have the
benefit of a witness or an easily named defendant."5  Thus, strict products
liability works within a system that treats plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs
unequally. Its dichotomy (traceable to Traynor and beyond) between victims
and responsible agents conceals distinctions in the victim category. The results
are regressive, as George Priest has written, because costs of liability in market
economies are passed to all customers. 5 ' Cross subsidies of women to men,
black to white, and poor to rich must follow. This result defeats the progressive
aims of reformers. 
52
3. For Narrowers: Unintended Public Effects
The Priest thesis, a critique of strict products liability, sheds light on tort
reform. Priest views expansive liability as paradoxically harmful to the class
that it is intended to benefit. Easy recovery seems to be good for consumers;
in practice, however, expanded liability has caused insurance companies to
refuse coverage, suppliers to withdraw desirable products and services, and the
poor to subsidize the rich through regressive surcharges added to the prices of
goods. 5 3 Even successful plaintiffs, the winners of civil liability, lose a big
fraction of their recovery in attorneys' fees and other transaction costs. Though
undermined somewhat by criticism,"' its dependence on an uncertain
premise, 55 the waxing fortunes of the American insurance industry (right now
there is no talk of crisis in the media), and overstatement by some who repeat
the idea,' 56 this argument remains important. It points out the danger of
150. See Abel, supra note 37, at 799.
151. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 35, at 1585-87.
152. The point of patterned inequities might appear to be an argument against private law rather
than public law, because the latter seeks to mitigate distinctions between individuals. To at least
some public-law reformers, discrimination is one of the many drawbacks of keeping private law
private, rather than a fixed fact that justifies resistance to reform. Until patterned inequities are
cured, however, expansion of private legal remedies will benefit litigants unequally.
Some objections to this conclusion, which are not compelling to me, might be made.
Expansionist reformers may value the transfer from defendants to plaintiffs so highly that they would
sacrifice equity between the races, genders or classes to this cause. (Intimate relationships may
permit women, although generally not persons of different races or classes, to benefit from the
advantageous position of white upper-class men.) Others may have chosen to reform liability rules
first and intend thereafter to turn their attention to bias. Still others may believe that the cross-
subsidy problem has been overstated.
153. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 35, at 1585-87.
154. See, e.g., Claybrook, supra note 36 (blaming high transaction costs on defendants).
155. As I have suggested elsewhere, part of the Priest argument relies on the assumption that
the insurance industry acted in good faith when it refused to renew policies or extend coverage. See
Anita Bernstein, A Duty to Warn: One American View of the EC Products Liability Directive, 20
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 224 (1991) [hereinafter Bernstein, A Duty to Warn].
156. See HUBER, supra note 16; OLSON, supra note 35.
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unintended effects that is posed by public law reform.
If, as I have argued, tort reform has important traits in common with its
predecessor, strict products liability, then it too may be vulnerable to the
problem of unintended public effects. Like expansionists, narrowers cannot
control the effects of their reform. The instrument is always too blunt. The
narrowers' counterpart to the expansionist problem of unequal distribution57
is an excess of reform. By clamping down on adjudication, making it less
available, tort reform achieves its goal of reducing the cost of civil liability; but
tort reform can have collateral effects on its sponsors.
The most important of these effects is the institutionalization of tort reform.
Expanded liability has created a class of service employees with incentives to
maintain their own livelihood. While the tort reform effort made excessive
verdicts and settlements both public relations devices' 5 -media attacks
emphasized the magnitude of jury verdicts' 59-and the target of reform," °
it is generally acknowledged that plaintiffs are not the main beneficiaries of these
payments. They receive less than half of the amount paid by defendants. 6'
The liability system supports people who work in law firms, insurance
companies, academia, the government (including court employees and legislative
staffers), and litigation-related enterprises, such as expert-witness suppliers.
Among those who work in the system, defense lawyers and insurers, as
important players, have the opportunity to protect their source of income by
adjusting to a reformed world with less products liability litigation. They do not
participate in tort reform with the goal of harming themselves. Thus the reform
effort itself has become a source of employment and income. 62 In perpetual
motion, it extracts funds from its beneficiaries as steadily as does the civil
liability system. Whether I am right in calling this effect unintended is not
157. See supra part llI.B.2.
158. Fred Strasser has chronicled the use by tort reformers of anecdotes about awards recovered
by undeserving plaintiffs. See Fred Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stories Never Die, Nat'l L.J., Feb.
16, 1987, at 39; Fred Strasser, Have Anecdotes, Not Facts, Fueled Tort Crisis?, Nat'l L. J. , Feb.
24, 1986, at 15.
159. Id.
160. Tort reformers have focused on the noneconomic elements of recovery, without which no
award is shockingly high.
161. See I AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 30 (1991) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK].
162. For example, the combined annual budget of the Product Liability Alliance, the Products
Liability Coordinating Council, and the Coalition for Uniform Product Liability Law-a small
fraction of trade associations lobbying for the federal reform act-is $1.5 million. See Sheila
Kaplan, Lobbying: The Business of Washington. These Perennials are Lobbyists' Cash Cows,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at 53. The amount, of course, is a fraction of the cost of the liability
system.
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clear, but it contravenes one stated bottom-line purpose of tort reform-to
reduce costs to business.
Other perverse results follow successful tort reform. Anecdotes and simple
economic theory suggest that reduced opportunities to recover tort damages tend
to discourage skillful plaintiffs' attorneys from contingency-fee work. The main
effect of this reduction in supply has been on injured persons, who have more
trouble finding capable lawyers. But members of the defense bar have
complained about this change as well, saying that some of their new adversaries
waste money and time, and that they are disorganized and untrustworthy. Even
though a botched plaintiff's case will increase the defendant's chance of
prevailing at trial, the additional cost of pretrial litigation may nullify this
gain. 6
Discouraged from personal-injury work, attorneys can find or create new
paths to the corporate treasury. The rise of ERISA litigation, for example,
developed quickly and has benefitted many plaintiffs and their counsel. Sources
of future litigation may include environmental torts, if public opinion continues
in the present direction, or action for damages in sex discrimination cases,
consistent with current civil rights law."6 Lawsuits between corporations may
flourish. What will replace personal injury litigation is hard to predict, but there
is no reason to suppose that the lucrative and stimulating work of using the legal
process to achieve financial gain will go unreplaced. 1
65
Tort reform does not stanch completely the sentiment that when businesses
err, they ought to be deterred, and perhaps punished to achieve aims other than
deterrence. Unless that belief or feeling ebbs, it will press other channels when
civil litigation is blocked. Part of the tort reform effort consisted of an attempt
to ease this sentiment, most conspicuously in the insurers' magazine
advertisements urging readers that "we all pay the price" for jury verdicts."
Some members of the tort reform movement have noted success in the
163. The conclusions of the foregoing paragraph are based on informal conversations with
products liability defense lawyers associated with New York firms.
164. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §102, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.)
1071, 1072-1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1981A); Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a Sexual
Harassment Case after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037 (1993).
165. Cf. Richard Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 917,918 (1985)
(describing institutions that resist change).
166. The phrase appears in promotional material prepared by the Insurance Information
Institute. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE LAWSUIT CRISIS 2 (n.d.). See also supra
note 52.
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endeavor. 67 It is a task that is never finished, however, and occasional
reactions (such as the furor over the Exxon oil spill, for example) indicate a
public desire to punish, deter, and correct corporate wrongdoing. This impulse
can be overstated. All other things being equal, beneficiaries of the tort reform
movement are in a better position with restricted opportunities for plaintiffs. But
some danger remains that the public may turn on tort reform, based on a belief
that the endeavor has gone too far.
The occasional tort reform anomaly reminds observers of unintended
effects. In Nogueiro v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals," for example, the
plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate all medical malpractice claims, pursuant to a
contract prepared by the defendant. When arbitrators awarded the plaintiff
$310,000 in "general damages" and $40,000 in "special damages" for breach
of contract, the California Court of Appeal permitted the award to stand despite
a state law limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to
$250,000.16  Here, two devices aimed at reducing the costs of liability to
defendants failed to prevent a large award.
Unintended effects thus range from important patterns to flukes-from
virtual certainties to farfetched possibilities. Overall this phenomenon is
significant. The connection that tort reform has made to financial interests
means that the movement cannot stop without threatening the income of some
players. When reformism reaches the point of diminishing returns, a conflict
must develop between those who finance tort reform advocates-namely,
business entities-and those who earn a living by keeping reform alive.
Intramovement conflicts have already begun to appear.' 7  These natural
divisions, coupled with the risk of Nogueiro-like reversals, suggest that tort
reform can be-although rarely is-as perverse as its expansionist counterpart.
4. Access to Courts
Strict products liability sought to improve the law by making litigation
easier for plaintiffs. Victims, who otherwise would falter under the conventional
burden of proof, would have the benefit of explicit strict liability. Defendants
who ought to be found liable under negligence, but who would escape blame
under the traditional burden of proof, would properly bear the cost of their
167. See Ted Gest, Why the Injured Lose Suits, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 8, 1991, at
52 (statements by Thomas Watkins of the Product Liability Advisory Council, and tort reform
advocate Victor Schwartz).
168. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1192 (1988).
169. Id. The court specifically refused to scrutinize the basis for this award.
170. See Lipsen, supra note 30, at 250-53 (describing conflicts between insurance companies
and manufacturers, and among different manufacturers with conflicting priorities).
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culpability. Heartened by this recognition of their plight, knowing that they
have less to prove, victims would be more likely to sue.
The tort reform movement, by contrast, seeks to improve the law by
making litigation more difficult for plaintiffs. The world that the reformer seeks
to create would include fewer claims, fewer victorious plaintiffs, lower awards,
more use of alternative dispute resolution devices, more screening of claims
before trial, and greater use of contractual alternatives to tort litigation.
Discouraged by these barriers to the courthouse, potential initiators of lawsuits
would be less likely to sue.
Access to courts is the one area where public-law reform makes a real
difference and where reformers actually are likely to achieve their goals. An
empirical study of the effect of state tort reform statutes passed in 1986 supports
this contention. 7' This study found that certain types of reform legislation
caused a reduction in insurer losses. ' The researchers did not find a decline
in the number of injuries or an effective shift in incentives to safety that might
have explained the benefit to insurers. " Instead, consumers "now bear more
of the risk of injuries, and manufacturers and physicians bear less." 74 What
made the liability system cheaper for insurers, the researchers concluded, were
reforms that made the liability system less attractive for plaintiffs and their
attorneys. Restrictions on joint and several liability, restrictions on pain and
suffering damages, and restrictions on punitive damages discouraged plaintiffs
from suing. 75
These findings support the common sense hypothesis that injured persons
will bring fewer lawsuits when the amounts that may be recovered are reduced.
Although public-law reform cannot address individual cases, it can effect a
change that makes the liability system more or less hospitable to an aggregate.
By reducing the amount that plaintiffs could recover for noneconomic loss, for
punishment of culpable defendants, or from wealthier defendants deemed
responsible for only a percentage of harm, state tort reform suppressed the flow
of claims to the courts.
171. See Glenn Blackmon& Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Refonn Legislation: Assessing Our
Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 30, at 272.
172. Id.
173. The authors found that the benefits to insurers were passed along to consumers in the form
of smaller premium increases. Although premiums became more expensive after tort reform, these
premiums would have increased even more without the reform statutes. Id. at 283.
174. Id. at 275.
175. Id. Other reforms that the authors studied, of less significance to insurer losses, included
regulation of insurance rates, modification of the collateral source rule, modification of dram shop
laws, and shorter statutes of limitations. Id. at 274.
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The contrary phenomenon occurred when strict products liability began to
encourage more injured persons to sue. Products liability actions by most
accounts increased dramatically in the late 1960s and 1970s, when theories of
enterprise responsibility conjoined with a flourishing consumer movement.
Large verdicts in federal courts grew in this period. Although these increases
did not deserve the inflammatory label of explosion,176 and although the data
about all products liability actions are distorted if they include the enormous
number of filings involving one product-asbestosT"-that did not emerge until
the mid-1970s, the conclusion remains inescapable that for a period of some
years, American courts became more attractive to plaintiffs alleging product
injury. The phenomenon cannot be described more exactly than increased
access. 179
Expanded or diminished access to courts, the great success of public-law
reform movements, is a crude kind of triumph. Modifying access is a major
goal of reformers, but not their only goal. Assuming that reformers want more
from their reform than hardship to their identified enemies-corporate
defendants or consumer plaintiffs and their attorneys-altered access to courts
does not fulfill their wishes. Altered access, moreover, is an unstable condition.
Reformers do not control it directly, and cannot know whether the change will
endure. Neither improvement nor reconciliation results from changing access
to courts.
C. The Recurring Question of Legitimacy
Each of the public-law reforms reached products liability doctrine in a
different way. Strict products liability percolated through the academy, notably
Yale,'" then the American Law Institute and state supreme courts. Tort
reform, a movement led by manufacturers and insurers, developed in
scholarship, journalism, and the media, but mostly it has focused on legislation.
176. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EXTENT OF "LITIGATION
EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED (1988); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986).
177. See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 82, at 521-22.
178. Doctrine was not overhauled in this era of increasing access to courts. See George L.
Priest, Products Liability and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184,
202-07 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988) (summarizing cases). Gary Schwartz
describes the change as an increase in "aggressiveness"; courts used expansively the powers they
had all along. See Gary T. Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative
Context, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION
28, 31, 32-33 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
179. See supra note 26; see also Priest, Enterprise Liability, supra note I (identifying Kessler
and James of Yale as originators of enterprise liability).
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Along with acceptance, however, has come the complaint that the reform
violates a jurisdictional norm. No movement, according to the critics, is
sufficiently representative of the affected population to be allowed to create
public law. Jurisdictional opposition rejects public-law reform because of its
excessive scope.
The tort reform results-failure at the uniform-law and congressional levels,
success in the state legislatures-highlight this position. Focused constituencies
were able to identify an area or two of products liability law and spur
lawmaking to change that area; thus they achieved change in most states.
When, however, reformers proposed a federal law, critics opposed the
legislation not only for what it said, but on grounds of federalism." Easier
to reject, the UPLA simply was not adopted as a whole, or even in large part,
by any state.'
Like the tort reform movement, strict products liability survived part, but
not all, of a jurisdictional challenge. Most American courts accepted the new
expression of products liability written in the major Traynor opinions and
Section 402A of the Restatement. They were willing to focus on the product,
inferring responsibility from the existence of a defect. Generally they have
refused, however, to deem a product defective when reasonable conduct by the
defendant could not have averted the harm. The downfall of Beshadaln shows
where courts have drawn the line; even where strict liability appears strict
indeed (manufacturing defects, express warranty), the doctrine accords with the
notion of a reasonable manufacturer. Courts, in sum, have been willing to
accept shifts in the burden of proof and also to create an intangible sense of
expansion, but they have stopped short of accepting pure loss spreading.
The jurisdictional claim now can be seen in some light. It questions reform
of private law to fulfill collective goals. This claim is at its most persuasive
when the public-law goal appears to be reallocation of the distribution of assets
in society. The objection is vulnerable to abuse. A reactionary critic could no
doubt find jurisdictional fault with any change in the law because the change will
have distributional effects. Taking the jurisdictional objection seriously does not
require endorsement of reaction, however. The magnitude of the distributional
effect can separate mere reaction from a complaint worth noting. A reform of
180. See Harvey S. Perman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism,
48 OHIO ST. LJ. 503 (1987); SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 54 (statement of Senator Hollings);
Marshall S. Shapo, Product Liability, Plain and Simple; Tort Law "Reform," Baroque and Messy,
in PRODUCT LIABIuTY REFORM, supra note 53, at 15.
181. See Lipsen, supra note 30, at 250 (stating that only two states passed bills modeled on the
UPLA, and both were vetoed by governors).
182. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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private law that generates widespread jurisdictional complaint is public law, and
goes too far.
I am not, I believe, retreating from analysis into polltaking. Arguing that
private law deserves a degree of isolation from public reform, I have relied on
the premise that most citizens in democracies prefer this separation. Where they
do not decry change in private law-for instances, a wrongful death statute, the
Uniform Commercial Code-as exceeding jurisdictional bounds, it is reasonable
to infer that the reform is corrective of private law rather than an attempt to
create public law.
IV. TOWARD A PRIVATE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Having presented some of the shortcomings of a public law of products
liability, I would turn now to the task of explaining what a private law might
look like, how it would function, and why it is superior to its public-law
counterpart. In its simplest description, a private law of products liability would
mediate differences concerning a contendedly defective product without attention
to the effects of this case on policy objectives or collective wealth. As I have
tried to show, all types of public products liability law tend to disappoint their
advocates. Private products liability law can be viewed -in negative terms. It
does not announce objectives, it cannot be bent or handicapped to produce some
optimal result, and, in its modesty, it does not generally let its adherents
down. 18
3
But it is impossible to devise a personal injury law for a democracy without
commenting on the kind of extrinsic policies to which I have alluded. No
society can adjudicate disputes without making choices about what matters in
that society.'" A pure private law of products liability, unaffected by policy,
consequentialism, or tradeoffs, exists nowhere." 5  Thus some work of
description remains.
First, one must look at the array of hopes grouped together as public goals.
When stated specifically, the controversial goals of products liability reformers
are loss spreading and reduced costs to business. The categories of
183. Cf. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977) ("As lawyers we will
do well to be on our guard against any suggestion that, through law, our society can be reformed,
purified, or saved.").
184. The examples are numerous. Only "tortious conduct" can be the basis of a tort action;
contracts made by minors are voidable.
185. See Symposium, supra note 32. My colleagues Steven Heyman and Richard Wright have
thought carefully about this point while writing about the jurisprudence of Aristotle, and I have
benefitted from exchanges with them.
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improvement and reconciliation, though accurate, describe those hopes in a more
euphemistic way, as do my prior categories: increased predictability, adjusted
costs of doing business, enhanced consumer welfare, and freer flow of goods.
These descriptions promote the goals to an unconverted audience. As I
suggested in my brief discussion of the jurisdiction question, controversy is a
useful measuring device. The point where reform proposals create conflict is
a good place to begin skepticism about the reform. But the blander goals of
improvement and reconciliation deserve some deference. Reform of products
liability doctrine is not the means to those ends. The basic ways to achieve
social benefits are spending and sanction.
Thinking about the option of spending and sanction to achieve public ends
clarifies for the reforming society what it wishes to express in doctrine. The
woolly "goals" detailed in Part II disappear. In the sections below, with the
help of references to the products liability law of Europe, I explore the path
toward a mature private law.
A. Regulation and Social Insurance
A private law of products liability cannot be indifferent to goals. It
requires, as a backdrop, commitment to the objectives of personal injury law.
Those objectives are reducing the likelihood of future harm and compensating
injured persons. These two collective benefits help to justify a social apparatus,
paid for by the state, to resolve disputes; they assert a state interest in questions
of individual harm. 186
Arguments in favor of more regulation and social insurance to accomplish
the goals now served by tort law are so familiar as to warrant only the briefest
summary."8 7 Liability cannot reduce risk, nor deter harm, so effectively as
186. Steven Smith has argued that the objective of tort law is dispute resolution, and that
"compensation, deterrence, or punishment are merely means which the system employs as
appropriate to achieve its primary end." Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A
Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767 (1987). The
point is attractive, but it requires elaboration (which Professor Smith does offer) to say why the state
must provide a forum for dispute resolution. Some view ofjustice is needed. Following Aristotle,
several writers connect dispute resolution with corrective justice. Corrective justice alone would
mandate the existence of civil law, courts, and enforcement of judgments, but not (necessarily)
published opinions, open tribunals, or scholarly literature about injury law, among other things. It
would also not require the state to impose fines or administrative constraints, nor the payment of
welfare allotments.
187. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE 1. REG. 65 (1989)
(containing economics arguments); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 555 (1985) (asserting the failure of the liability system).
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regulation; nor can it compensate so effectively as social insurance."' Few
would dispute the theoretical appeal of the argument in favor of regulation and
social insurance.'"
To move toward the specific-and to elaborate my premise that regulation
and social insurance do not exist, in any serious way, in the United States-I
define my terms. Arguing in favor of "regulation," I have 'in mind an agency
with broad authority over product safety: either a revitalized and better-funded
Consumer Product Safety Commission, or a successor." 9  By "social
insurance" I refer to an acceptance of responsibility by government to protect
individuals when certain harms-illness, temporary total unemployment,
permanent total disability, partial disability, or a lack of minimal income-befall
them. 191
These ideas are not hopelessly utopian: some elements of this world have
been established in Europe, although fitfully. Social insurance varies among
European countries. For several years the trend has been toward
retrenchment." 9  But the European commitment to the well-being of citizens
generally exceeds that of the United States, and national governments manage
to afford this level of support without impoverishing themselves. Collective
prosperity can be enhanced through reform, as public-law advocates maintain,
but the reform measure that has demonstrated achievement is social insurance,
not changes in liability rules.
In regulation, too, Europe provides some guidance. A federal safety law,
adopted by the European Community, has the potential to demonstrate the
188. See Viscusi, supra note 187, at 66.
189. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REvOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 74-110 (1990) (describing the promise of regulation and how it fails).
190. Product safety regulation in the United States today is the task of the underfunded and
disengaged Consumer Product Safety Commission, with ancillary involvement by other agencies:
the Environmental Protection Agency (jurisdiction over certain products, such as asbestos), the
National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (automobiles and related products), the Food
and Drug Administration (drugs, cosmetics, medical devices and food), and the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (products in the workplace), among others. State and local governments
play a very small role. Most observers of product safety regulation agree that the CPSC has a
meager record of accomplishment, and that the other agencies, which have achieved some success,
could do better with more funding and a greater commitment to regulation in the national
administration. For a rare defense of the CPSC record-although hardly a paean-see DAVID
BOLUNGER & JOAN CLAYBROOK, FREEDOM FROM HARM: THE CIVILIZING EFFECT OF HEALTH,
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 163-87 (1986).
191. I derive my list from an American Law Institute report. See 2 AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISERESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES
TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 559-74 (1991).
192. See Bernstein, A Duty to Warn, supra note 155.
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promise of regulation." Although internal politics in the Community
produced a safety directive much weaker than the original Commission
proposal"9 (another instance of dilution), the measure retains some
importance. It affirms a general safety obligation and a requirement for
producers to provide some information about risks. 95 It imposes on the
nations of Europe an obligation to empower authorities at the national level;
these authorities in turn report to the European Commission." Although the
Safety Directive has lost the bold language of its earlier incarnation, it provides
a blueprint for the mission that was expressed by the unit head who monitors it:
the Safety Directive can "improve consumer confidence in the safety of products
in the internal market." 197
The European experience offers realistic support for regulation and social
insurance. On a conceptual level, regulation and social insurance are superior
to liability in that they address their goals directly. To achieve market
deterrence and compensation through liability in the aggregate requires
cooperation from several individuals and institutions, even if the perils I have
described are put to one side. A notion of competence-that is, institutional
ability to attain a goal-mandates regulation and social insurance to achieve
compensation and deterrence.
I want to make the more controversial claim, however, that products
liability reform cannot exist without an explicit and meaningful commitment to
these two institutions. Advocates of tort reform or defenders of strict products
liability cannot contend that their measure is better than a combination of
regulation and social insurance as an instrument of collective ends on which the
entire polis can agree. Private-law adherents may disagree with these advocates
about their proposal, but until the two Sources of real collective benefit are
acknowledged, the debate cannot even begin.
This requirement would help separate genuine public-law reformers from
opportunists. The business wing of the tort reform movement in particular has
on occasion endorsed regulation as a theoretical alternative to liability, but
resisted actual rules. Social insurance is financed by taxes, and at least one tort
reform writer has conveyed his low opinion of the American liability system
193. 1992 O.J. (L 228) 35 [hereinafter Safety Directivel.
194. See 1989 O.J. (C 193) 32. The draft proposal mandated the creation of a well-funded
regulatory sector in each country, data collection to determine potential hazards to safety, and
centralized reporting.
195. Safety Directive, supra note 193, art. 3 (2).
196. Id., art. 5.
197. Interview, Girard Zahlen, Chef d'Unit6 3, Securit6 Gndrale des Produits et Services,
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Oct. 29, 1992.
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with the metaphor of tax.'" The adversaries of business defendants in the
plaintiffs' bar who equate strict products liability, as it has developed, with
fairness and access to justice must likewise confront a possible conflict between
what is good for them and what would serve their clients.
Arguments against regulation and social insurance warrant only a short
response. A recurring complaint is that they are expensive: and both regulation
and social insurance ultimately collide with cost-effectiveness. 9  Because
neither measure is justified beyond a point, both regulation and social insurance
must stop somewhere. From the view of products liability law, the right amount
is reached when changes in the law no longer look attractive or plausible as a
source of public benefit. An advanced society must continue to enhance safety
and compensation for its members. Affluent countries can pay for a higher level
of these goods.
Critics have observed that regulation has had a poor record in the United
States.'5  Its major problem is inadequate enforcement,"' although more
intractable problems of perverse adaptation to regulation (what economists call
offsetting behavior') may exist; and regulation is always limited by the
ability of regulators in the design and scope they choose. Serious enforcement,
however, is still untried. It ought to come before doctrinal reform.
There remains a valid argument against emphasizing regulation and social
insurance at the expense of liability. American adversaries of tort reform have
defended strict products liability as a source, albeit not an ideal one, of
compensation and deterrence. 3  Because increases in regulation and social
insurance are unlikely to occur-in part due to the efforts of some constituents
of the tort reform movement-these advocates view expansive liability as a
necessary, if blunt, instrument for desired ends. When weakly stated, the
contention has some merit. It requires one qualification, however:
Acknowledgement of the benefits of expansive liability is not a public law
reform at all. By defending the status quo, it looks backward rather than
forward, and proposes no change. Thus what Traynor, Prosser, and other
innovators created in decades past is crucially different from the posture now
staked out by adversaries of reform.
198. See HUBER, supra note 16, at 11.
199. See SUNSTEINsupra note 189, at 90-91. But see BOLLINGER & CLAYBROOK, supra note
190, at 199-203 (containing a critique of cost-benefit analysis).
200. See INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 161, at 243-49 (containing a summary by
Kip Viscusi of his and others' studies of American regulation).
201. See id.; Teresa M. Schwartz, A Product Safety Agenda for the 1990s, 45 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1355, 1368 (1988); SUNSTEIN, supra note 189, at 74-110.
202. See INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 161, at 247-49 and sources cited therein.
203. See Claybrook, supra note 36; Preiser, supra note 54.
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The defense of expansive strict products liability properly challenges all
products liability reform proposals now current in the United States, from
measures reducing the liability exposure of business to more arcane ideas such
as "neo no fault"' and contract theories. 5 It establishes the merits of the
status quo. It helps to set a baseline of deterrence and compensation: if
reformers respect these goals, then they are obliged not to advocate a reform
that will lower the aggregate of these benefits. The posture has its virtues.
But much energy is needed to maintain it, and advocates may not be
expanding their energy wisely when they work to protect a circuitous and flawed
source of social benefit. The strategic choice to defend expansive liability rather
than work for regulation and social insurance is easier in the short run: it favors
the status quo rather than attempts real change. Over time, however, the task
of creating meaningful compensation and deterrence will require more effort
toward affirmative change. Public-law defenders of expansive liability such as
Joan Claybrook and Ralph Nader reflect this dilemma in their careers, and it is
worth noting that they have chosen to expend more of their reform efforts on
regulation than liability law.
Regulation and social insurance, should they become serious projects, might
acquire an interested constituency like the plaintiffs' bar and tort reform
professionals, but right now the class of occupation that will profit from them
is unassembled. Thus these two methods of achieving public benefit are not
only more direct than expanded liability but also less vulnerable to the charge
of venality described above. Separating private questions of liability from
instrumental purpose avoids an appearance as well as a reality of conflict
between product users and their advocates.
B. A Private Law
Once a social policy of regulation and social insurance is accepted as the
source of collective benefit, a private law of products liability can take shape.
This private law applies to disputes between individuals. It acknowledges the
collective status of plaintiff and defendant, however, by adjusting the burden of
proof. As a group, products users are generally at a disadvantage with respect
to information: it is fairer to require manufacturers to explain, after an injury
has been caused by their product, why the product was not defective. As
several writers have noted, this simple approach best explains products liability
law.'
204. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident
Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REV. 898 (1985).
205. See id.; Epstein, Products Liability, supra note 54.
206. See Powers, supra note 10; Schwartz, supra note 99.
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A second look at European law helps illuminate this subject. Whereas
labels like "strict products liability" or "fault principle" mislead, the dichotomy
between private and public laws of products liability indicates a real difference
in approach." Tort reform and strict products liability view the participants
in products liability as members of classes who need either more or less
advantage in the system. A private law approach notes only the least
controversial of the class differences-that those who market a product know
more about it than those who have no control or knowledge of its
manufacture-and thereafter leaves the dispute up to the litigants.
For many years, European law has been able to develop a private law of
products liability by revising old doctrines rather than proclaiming
innovations.' The civil law tradition lacks a formal articulation of strict
liability, and the civil law of defective products derives from obligations
grounded in tort and contract. Thus far the idea of strict products liability,
whereby the plaintiff can recover though unable to prove fault or the existence
of a contract, appears alien to the civil law tradition. But a private law can
work around these principles.
French law, in particular, benefitted from a tradition of broadly stated laws
that allowed for judicial creativity. French jurists were thus able to fashion a
rule of strict liability for defective products. One French Civil Code statute
provides that a seller warrants a chattel to be free of latent defects that make the
item unfit for its intended use.2 9 Following a long tradition dating back to
Celsius, French courts have interpreted this law to impose liability even on
sellers who are ignorant of a defect and act in good faith.2"0 French courts
also worked around the privity rule,2"' as Cardozo was later to do in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.212
The French principle offait de la chose2 3 recognized that things in one's
charge could "act." Like traditional strict liability in Anglo-American law, fait
207. See supra note 178.
208. For a further discussion, see Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products
Liability Attempted in the European Community, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 697-700 (1991)
[hereinafter Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante].
209. Code Civil [C. Civ.], art. 1643 [Fr.).
210. See H. DUINTJERTEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY 84-85 (1979) (citations
omitted).
211. Id. at 87.
212. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
213. See Hessel E. Yntema, 7he Law of Obligations, in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD
69-70 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965); see also Andr6 Tunc, Introduction to 11
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 28 (Andr6 Tunc ed., 1974).
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de la chose linked harm to the lapse of an individual." 4 French courts have
also held that the same condition of a product that would give rise to liability by
a seller to a buyer constitutes fault in regard to third persons. 211 They
achieved this advance in doctrine by reinterpreting fait de la chose, which
imposes liability on the keeper of a thing. The keeper became the manufacturer
with the help of garde de la structure, a concept that focused on control of the
internal dynamism. 16  These new interpretations created a doctrine that
required a plaintiff to prove only a defect causally linked to injury. In virtually
all cases, this proof can constitute an irrebuttable presumption of fault.21 7
Consistent with this description of private law, European courts have also
manipulated the burden of proof. Of the countries that are members of the
European Community, France has altered the burden of proof most in favor of
plaintiffs, with Luxembourg following closely and Belgium accepting a slightly
moderated form of French innovation." 8 These countries have achieved strict
liability while refraining from the attempt to create public law.
V. CONCLUSION
This theory of products liability reform describes identifiable stages that
take place during attempts to change products liability law. The theory is
confined to reform of the law of industrialized democracies. 2 9
Industrialization is a necessary condition for well-developed products liability
law; the existence of a democratic government means that reformers cannot
214. Both traditional and modem strict liability refer to liability for accidental harm based on
the unusual nature of a hazard rather than negligent conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1977); Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774 (1865), L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866),
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Under strict liability, an actor who has created a risk in excess of what
her community tolerates is held responsible for resultant harm. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Ton Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1972) (describing a paradigm of reciprocal
risks). Although strict liability relaxes the fault requirement, activity by an individual is still the
basis of liability. See Golden v. Amory, 329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 1952) (stating that
there is no strict liability for an unforeseeable act of God). Compare Noble v. Yorke, 490 So. 2d
29 (Fla. 1986) (stating that strict liability is based on an owner's knowledge of vicious propensity
of dog) with Rolen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 240 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1970) (stating there was no
strict liability because owner's knowledge of vicious propensity not shown).
215. See Malinvaud, Responsibiliti du Fabricant, in GAZETTE Du PALAiS If, 463 No. 20
(1973).
216. See Berthold Goldman, Garde de la Structure et Garde du Comportment, II MELANGES
ROUBIER, 51 Tune. (1957).
217. See Michael Whincup, Product Liability Laws in Common Market Countries, 19 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (1982).
218. See Orban, supra note 62, at 350.
219. The theory addresses attempts to manipulate doctrine rather than to preempt it: hence a
major preemption of accident law such as the New Zealand compensation scheme, which covers
most product-caused injuries, has not been of concern here.
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change the law by command; they depend on persuasion and cooperation.
Reform begins with the observation that products liability law is a system.
With that observation comes an almost simultaneous desire for improvement.
In addition to improvement, reformers attempt reconciliation of doctrine. Eager
to promote their reform, proponents declare goals that they hope will appear
attractive to those who are not members of the reform effort. A need to
promote the reform is the first difficulty that advocates encounter: they find that
opposition and dilution undermine their measure. Although reform can achieve
some success, this gain is accompanied by perverse results.
In the Introduction, I referred to the need for analysts of products liability
reform to suspend temporarily their partisanship for or against "tort reform" or
traditional "strict products liability," which are battle cries as well as names' of
reforms. Some distance is necessary to grasp the general characteristics of all
reform movements. An opportunity for this kind of nonpartisanship came my
way in my study of products liability reform in the European Community. 2M
Leaving the American conflict behind, I saw in the European Community
products liability directive 1 all of the elements of public-law reform.
Advocates of products liability reform in the Community sought to improve
and reconcile the various laws of the member nations. Their vision of
improvement focused on consumer protection and risk shifting.' The
improvement and reconciliation of divergences in the Community, a process
known as "harmonization," is aimed at the advancement of economic and social
progress-public-law goals reminiscent of the American efforts studied here.
Proponents of reform via directive stated their goals of increased predictability,
adjusted costs of marketing products, enhanced consumer welfare, and freer
flow of goods.?'
Opposition and dilution promptly followed. A draft products liability
directive was blocked by industry, as well as representatives from member
220. See Bernstein, Looking at Europe, supra note 32; Bernstein, A Duty to Warn, supra note
155; Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante, supra note 208.
221. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products,
1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Directive].
222. See Commission Proposal of 14 October 1976 for a Council Directive Relating to the
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the Member States
Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1976 O.J. (C 241) 9 [hereinafter Proposal].
223. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, art. 100.
224. See Proposal, supra note 222, Preamble.
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nations with important concentrations of manufacturers.' Even though the
European Community does not have a tradition of federalism, limited national
powers, narrow construction of measures contrary to a common law, or
incrementalism,' the attempt to create a Community law of products liability
faced the recurring question of jurisdiction.2 7 After dilution, the proposed
directive did not require member states to impose caps on damages, and, as in
American strict liability, a state-of-the-art defense emerged; moreover, the most
controversial provisions of the new law-its true changes in the law-became
optional to each member nation.22
Even in its diluted form, the revised directive faced opposition in most
member nations. Only one out of the twelve countries implemented the directive
in a manner both timely and satisfactory to the European Commission.' But
as of this writing, ten of the twelve nations have obeyed the directive, and
implemented an opposed-and-diluted reform measure. Its effects remain to be
seen.
The European Community is a laboratory in which to test my theory of
products liability reform. The directive is almost in place. Will perversity,
futility, and jeopardy follow?' Can expansionist reform conquer patterned
inequities?"' Will judges cooperate? My dour predictions are on record. 232
225. See Kathleen M. Nilles, Note, Defining the Limits of Liability: A Legal and Political
Analysis of the European Community Products Liability Directive, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 753
(1985).
226. See John T. Lang, Development of European Community Constitutional Law, 25 INT'L
LAW 455 (1991).
227. See Legal Affairs, supra note 62, at 7.
228. See Directive, supra note 221, art. 15(l)(b) (state-of-the-art defense may be suppressed
by national law); id., art. 16(1) (optional cap on damages).
229. See Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante, supra note 208.
230. See supra note 29.
231. The general rule in Europe is that the poor do not sue: unless that tradition changes, the
expansive law reform of the Directive will expand the law only to favor advantaged victims. See
supra part III.B.2. Little information is available about the importance to plaintiffs of their race and
sex in European litigation, mainly because civil liability awards in Europe have not been the subject
of alarmed inquiry. In the Directive, however, Europe has reversed its traditional distaste for
litigation. The Directive opens the courthouse doors. This change suggests a new need for
empirical investigation of how race, sex or another immutable characteristic-nationality, perhaps-
affects the fate of a litigant in a European court.
For descriptions of the limited access to courts in Europe, see Erhard Blankenburg & Ulrike
Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated Profession, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL
LAW WORLD 124, 144 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) [hereinafter 2 LAWYERS
IN SOCIETY]; Kees Schuyt, The Rise of Lawyers in the Dutch Welfare State, in 2 LAWYERS IN
SOCIETY, 200, 209, 212; Anne Boigeol, The French Bar: The Difficulties of Unifying a Divided
Profession, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, 258, 280-81.
According to Richard Abel, who has surveyed the available material on barriers to litigation
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In the future, new laboratories will emerge, as other democracies attempt to
advance their products liability doctrine. The perpetual tension between private
law rules and the impulse toward synthesis will test this hypothesis about public
law reform.
in Europe (he focuses on England), plaintiffs who are members of certain groups are disadvantaged.
See Richard L. Abel, £r of Cure, Ounces of Prevention, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1003 (1985) (book
review). See also Abel, supra note 37, at 796-802 (combining European and American data).
232. See Bernstein, A Duty to Warn, supra note 155; Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante, supra
note 208; see also Jane Stapleton, Products Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 392 (1986) (discussing skepticism about Directive); cf. Robert C. Weber, Japanese Law
Edges Westward, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 13 (discussing skepticism about nascent products
liability reform in Japan).
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